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Abstract
We study optimal promotion decisions of hierarchical firms, with one junior and one
senior managerial position, which interact in a search and matching labor market. Workers
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it is vacant, otherwise they search for senior positions on the market. The promotion cut-
offs of the competing firms exhibit strategic complementarity, but we show that generically a
unique stable symmetric general equilibrium exists. If workers have homogeneous skills, then
an increase in the skill level induces faster promotion. In the presence of two skill levels in the
work force an increase of the fraction of high skilled leads to slower promotion of both types
of workers, where the promotion threshold for high skilled workers is substantially below that
for low skilled workers. This implies earlier promotions of high skill workers compared to
the low skilled consistent with available empirical evidence. Finally, we show that inserting
pyramidal firms, which have twice as many junior than senior positions, into the market
induces all firms to promote later. Pyramidal firms in equilibrium promote substantially
later than vertical firms which is supported by the existing empirical findings. The paper
also makes a methodological contribution by combining search and matching theory with
simulations in order to characterize the general equilibrium promotion cut-offs in a market
setting with heterogeneous hierarchical firms.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that workers progress in their careers by means of internal promo-
tions within firms, job-to-job transitions between firms and experience accumulation 1. However,
existing research analyzes promotions and job-to-job mobility within different strands of liter-
atures. Whereas search and matching studies developed strong techniques for the analytical
treatment of on-the-job search and between-firm mobility of workers, research on internal pro-
motions within firms is conducted in the literature on internal labour markets and principle agent
models2. In this study we develop a unified search and matching framework with hierarchical
firms, experience accumulation, job-to-job mobility and internal promotions. A combination of
these areas leads to new insights on how the composition of the applicant pool, competition be-
tween (heterogeneous) firms and search frictions influence the optimal timing of promotions. Our
model is compatible with the empirical evidence that high skill workers are promoted faster than
low skill workers and are overrepresented in higher hierarchical levels of firms. Moreover, in a
setting with pyramidal firms we show that stronger competition for workers on lower hierarchical
levels forces firms to require more experience which delays internal promotions.
In particular, we develop a search and matching model with three hierarchical levels in the
career ladder. The first level consists of non-managerial jobs available to all workers without
frictions. In addition, there are firms in the market consisting of two professional positions: one
junior position and one senior position. This structure implies that there are three hierarchical
job levels and two submarkets in our model: the primary market for young inexperienced indi-
viduals applying for their first junior manager position and a secondary market for experienced
workers applying for senior manager positions. Firms with open positions post vacancies in each
of the two submarkets respectively. As in Gibbons and Waldman (1999) the productivity of ju-
nior managers is growing over time due to experience accumulation and there is complementarity
between experience and the hierarchical layer the worker is assigned to.
The main choice variable of the firm is the promotion time. Specifically, firms choose the
minimum experience cut-off which is necessary for the junior worker to be internally promoted
to the senior level. This experience cut-off is announced by the firm in the beginning of the
employment relationship. Note that the actual promotion can only take place if the junior worker
accumulated the minimum experience level set by the firm and there is an open senior position
in this firm. This is different from the model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999), where every
worker can always be promoted in every firm and promotions do not depend on the availability
of open positions at higher hierarchical levels. The tradeoff for firms can be characterized in the
following way: if the inexperienced worker is promoted too early in his/her career, this worker
will have a relatively low productivity after the promotion because this worker’s experience is
too low for the senior level. In this situation it is a better strategy for the firm to wait and search
for a more experienced worker in the secondary submarket for senior managers. This submarket
exists because some workers have already reached sufficient experience to be promoted, but there
are no open positions in their firms. Thus these workers start searching for senior managerial
jobs with alternative employers (on-the-job search). This is different from the model of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), where all employees are always searching for better paid jobs, and shows
1Baker et al. (1994), Lluis (2005), Bidwell and Mollick (2015), Cassidy et al. (2016)
2Excellent surveys on both research directions are Rogerson et al. (2005) and Waldman (2009) respectively
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that promotions and on-the-job search are closely linked to each other, moreover, this link is
missing in the previous studies.
Based on this model we find that the optimal promotion time of a given firm is increasing
in the average promotion time of the market, so there is strategic complementarity between the
promotion times of the different firms. This is because the optimal individual promotion time
of the firm depends on the distribution of experience of managerial applicants in the secondary
submarket, which again is determined by the promotion decisions of the other firms in the
market. We account for this competition effect by characterizing Nash equilibrium assuming
steady states of the labor flows. We find that there are two symmetric Nash equilibria but only
one of them is stable. In addition, we analyze the steady state adjustment of worker stocks and
transition probabilities in response to the optimal promotion time set by the firms. We find that
this general equilibrium effect is mitigating the individual intentions of firms. In particular, if
one firm has incentives to delay promotions of its’ junior workers and hire more senior managers
in the market it will choose a higher experience requirement. Positive optimal response implies
that other firms also delay promotions of their junior workers and require higher experience.
Because of this workers stay longer in junior positions and there are fewer applicants in the
senior submarket, so job-to-job transitions between firms are substantially reduced and internal
promotions become a more important source of upward mobility for workers. This shows how
the general equilibrium effect counteracts the initial decision of firms.
We consider three extensions of our benchmark model. First, we assume that additional
output is generated if two workers (junior and senior) are working together as a team. We find
that such team synergy is associated with earlier promotions. The reason is that search frictions
in the senior submarket are more severe, so hiring junior workers is easier for firms in our model
than hiring experienced managers. So, in order to fill both positions, firms promote their own
junior employees earlier compared to the benchmark case and try to hire another junior worker
afterwards. This strategy leads to the highest gain from the team synergy for firms.
In the second extension we consider skill heterogeneity of workers, assuming that high skill
workers are more productive than low skill workers only in senior managerial jobs. This model
extension can explain the empirical evidence that high skill workers are promoted earlier than
low skill workers (Baker et al. (1994), McCue (1996) and Lluis (2005)). In addition, there is
substitution between the two skill groups. If there are exogenous reasons forcing firms to promote
one skill group earlier, they will delay promotions of the other skill group and let them accumulate
more experience. We show that increasing the fraction of high skill workers in the population
induces slower promotions of all workers, whereas in a setting with homogeneous workers an
increase of the skill level leads to faster promotions. The key difference between these scenarios
is that under worker heterogeneity an increase of the fraction of high skill workers increases the
expected skill of a worker hired from the market relative to the skill of the junior worker under
consideration for internal promotion, regardless of the actual type of the junior worker. This
induces a delay in internal promotions. With homogeneous workers by definition the skill of an
outside hire is always identical to that of an internally promoted worker.
In the third extension a fraction of professional firms has a pyramidal structure with one
senior position and two junior positions. Here we follow the empirical evidence, e.g. Caliendo
et al. (2015) who reports that a vast majority of firms in their sample have a hierarchical
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pyramidal structure with several layers, such that workers situated at higher layers earn higher
wages. We find that in the presence of pyramidal firms promotions occur later than if only
vertical firms are in the market. The reason is that a larger number of junior positions in
the market leads to the oversupply of experienced workers, thus hiring experienced managers
becomes easier for firms. At the same time there is stronger competition between firms for
inexperienced workers starting their career since there is a larger number of vacancies in this
submarket. Thus a longer experience requirement allows firms to keep their junior workers longer
in the firm and reduces the cost of labour turnover. Pyramidal firms promote later than their
vertical competitors because the fraction of time in which they have vacant senior positions is
smaller which makes it more attractive to keep junior workers longer in their current position.
One empirical implication of this finding is that workers in large pyramidal firms have more
experience and earn higher wages compared to the small vertical firms, which is supported by
the existing empirical research (Lallemand et al., 2007; Oi and Idson, 1999). Moreover, we find
that the firm size wage premium is increasing with the hierarchical level of the position, which
is inline with a recent empirical finding in Fox (2009).
Apart from these new economic insights about optimal promotion strategies of firms this
paper also makes a methodological contribution to the literature by combining an analytical
approach with a simulation analysis in order to characterize general equilibrium behavior of
firms also in the extensions of the model with heterogeneous firms and workers in which a full
analytical treatment is no longer feasible. For the benchmark model with homogeneous firms
and workers we are able to provide a full analytical characterization of the firms’ best response
functions and also of the labor flows under the stationary distribution. Based on this we can
numerically determine the general equilibrium of the model under different parameter settings.
For the extension with heterogeneous workers we are still able to provide an analytical
characterization of firms’ best response, but we can no longer determine in closed form the
transition rates resulting from a given set of promotion cut-offs followed by all firms on the
market. Hence, we use an agent-based simulation framework to determine the long-run transition
rates. Finally, for the extension with heterogeneous firms also the characterization of the firms’
best responses by analytical means is no longer feasible. Hence, in this case we also employ a
simulation approach to numerically determine the best response functions of the firms of different
type and use this to determine the general equilibrium of the model. In order to validate the
simulation approach we first implement it for the benchmark case for which analytical results
are available and show that the simulation approach replicates the analytical results with a
high degree of precision and reliability. Our methodological approach allows to analyze models,
which otherwise would be intractable, in a rigorous way based on standard equilibrium concepts.
The validation of our simulation approach using theoretical findings for the benchmark serves
as disciplining device for the setup and implementation of the simulation study. We believe
that this combination of methodologies can be fruitfully applied for many issues in labor market
research and beyond.
Our study is closely related to the literature on organizational hierarchies and internal labour
markets. Organizational hierarchies are intensively studied since the seminal contribution by
Garicano (2000). This paper considers an endogenous formation of firm hierarchies based on
the time constraint for acquiring knowledge by workers. Some (ex-ante homogeneous) agents
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acquire special knowledge and are specializing in problem-solving; these agents are the managers
and are situated on the top level of the firm hierarchy, while other agents are specialized on the
actual production. Thus the equilibrium organization structure is pyramidal, with each layer of
a smaller size than the previous one. This benchmark model is extended in different directions by
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2015). The literature on knowledge-based hierarchies is successful
in explaining empirical facts and it is an appealing feature of this theory that hierarchies arise
endogenously when matching problems to those who know how to solve them. On the other hand,
this research direction is lacking dynamics in individual careers, as workers assigned to different
levels are never promoted within or across firms, thus there is no link between organizational
hierarchies and career paths of individuals.
The second research stream is dealing with internal labour markets, so the main focus here is
on individual career paths and promotions but the firm hierarchy is taken exogenously and fixed
in this literature. One large research direction here includes tournament models in the spirit of
Lazear and Rosen (1981). In their setting promotion decisions are modeled as a tournament in
which workers exert costly effort to perform better than their coworkers and to be considered for
promotion. Later tournament models include the fact that promotions can be used as a signal of
higher ability, see for example, Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001). Recent studies, such as DeVaro
(2006) confirm empirically that firms are choosing wage spreads strategically to elicite more
effort from their employees. In addition, DeVaro and Waldman (2012) find that promotions
are sometimes used as a signal of worker’s ability. While the role of competition in providing
working incentives to employees must be acknowledged, we focus on human capital accumulation
as a reason for promotion and analyse between-firm competition for experienced employees.
The literature on human capital accumulation and job assignments is more closely related to
our research. The seminal contribution here is by Gibbons and Waldman (1999). In their study
worker’s productivity depends on the individual’s skill level, accumulated experience and the
hierarchical layer the worker is assigned to. As workers accumulate experience and knowledge
they are optimally promoted by firms to higher positions due to the assumed complementarity
between workers productivity (skills and accumulated experience) and hierarchical layers within
the firm. We use the same setup as a starting point in our model. Overall, the literature on
career paths and promotions is successful in explaining wage dynamics of individuals within firms,
whether due to experience accumulation or exerted effort. However, most of this literature is
based on the principal agent modeling approach in isolation from the labour market and doesn’t
allow for the study of interaction between organizational structures and the economy. Most of
these studies make restrictive assumptions on the model structure ensuring that there are no
job changes between firms in the equilibrium.
Next our study is conducted in the search and matching framework (Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985)). We model job-to-job transitions following the ap-
proach of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). To the best of our knowledge the first study analyzing
tenure in a search and matching framework with job-to-job transitions is Pissarides (1994).
There are good and bad jobs in his setting, thus unemployed workers accept bad jobs but con-
tinue searching for good jobs. An important feature of the model is that workers accumulate
job-specific experience and their wage grows over time. In the equilibrium very experienced
workers with high wages stop searching at all since the gain from moving to a good job becomes
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smaller than the cost of searching. The main difference of this study from current work is that
we treat experience as transferable across firms while it is completely lost upon the quit in Pis-
sarides (1994). Recent work in this field includes prominent extensions by Burdett and Coles
(2003), Burdett et al. (2011) and Bagger et al. (2014). These studies analyse tenure accumula-
tion with on-the-job search, but they do not consider internal promotions. From the perspective
of matching we use an urn-ball matching mechanism. Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001) and
Albrecht et al. (2003) show that this matching function is increasing in both unemployment and
vacancies and has constant returns to scale for large values of both arguments. The reason for
using the urn-ball matching mechanism rather than a more traditional Cobb-Douglas approach,
is that the urn-ball matching function is micro-founded and can be directly implemented in the
simulation whereas the Cobb-Douglas approach is a ”black box” from the perspective of practial
implementation. Thus using the urn-ball matching technology allows us to closely replicate the
analytical model in the simulation setting and avoid discrepancies in the approximation of the
matching technology.
Finally, our study is related to work in the area of agent-based simulations of the labour
market. The usefulness of this approach for the analysis of dynamic labour market issues has
been clearly demonstrated in the literature, which is reviewed for example in Neugart and
Richiardi (2018). Moreover, it has also been shown that agent-based models are very successful
in reproducing large sets of empirical stylized facts on different levels of aggregation in several
economic areas, including labour markets (see e.g. Axtell (2018), Dawid and Delli Gatti (2018),
Dawid et al. (2018), Dosi et al. (2017)). The high potential of agent-based approaches for
the analysis of labour market issues, in particular such that consider effects of institutional
differences, has been stressed among others by Richard Freeman in Freeman (1998, 2007).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the economic
framework and analyse the dynamics of workers and firms across states. Section 3 presents the
value functions of firms and their choice of the optimal promotion time as well as the emerging
partial and general equilibrium in the benchmark setting. In section 4 we extend the model
to two skill groups. Section 5 considers the extension of the benchmark model with pyramidal
firms and section 6 shows the robustness of our findings with respect to changes in the firms’
production function. Section 7 concludes the paper. The Appendices contain additional details
of our analysis, including an extensive description and validation of the simulation approach
used in parts of our study.
2 The Model
2.1 The economic framework
Time is continuous with an infinite horizon. There is a continuum of both firms and workers
with a total measure of workers normalised to 1. The inflow of new workers into the labour
market is denoted by d. In the benchmark model all entering workers are homogeneous with
identical skills, however, in the extension we also analyze consequences of skill heterogeneity.
Job ladders have three hierarchical levels. All young workers entering the market immediately
take simple jobs on the low level. These are subsistence jobs that don’t yield any professional
experience. All entering firms are identical and every firm is a dyad consisting of two positions:
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one junior position and one senior (managerial) position. The inflow of new firms is denoted by
n. Both positions are empty when the firm enters the market and can be posted simultaneously.
Posting an open position (junior or senior) is associated with a flow cost s for the firm. For
the purpose of tractability we assume that there are no dismissals, thus the pool of applicants
for junior positions consists of young workers employed in low level jobs. Only workers with
substantial professional experience are eligible to apply for senior positions. Let u denote the
stock of workers in low level jobs, e1 – are workers employed in junior positions and e2 denotes
managers in senior positions, so that u+ e1 + e2 = 1 due to the normalisation.
Once accepted in the junior position young workers start accumulating professional expe-
rience x ≥ 0 with x˙ = 1. This experience is observable by the current employer but not by
other firms in the market. It is general human capital and can be fully transferred to other
firms. In the beginning of the employment relationship with some inexperienced worker every
firm i chooses an experience cut-off x¯i, which makes the worker eligible for promotion to the
senior position in this firm. Even though x¯i is an endogenous choice variable of the firm, we
assume that it is written down in the labour contract and verifiable by court. Once the worker
reached experience x¯i, the firm is obliged to provide an experience evaluation to the worker and
promote this worker to the senior position if this position is free. In the opposite case when the
senior position is filled, the worker starts applying to senior positions in other firms. This is
the process of on-the-job search. The documented experience evaluation is a sufficient proof of
experience for other employers. We assume that experience accumulation is costly to workers,
thus workers stop learning upon receiving an experience evaluation and start searching on-the-
job. Intuitively, we model situations when firms encourage junior workers to attend training
courses taking a part of the working time up to the level of human capital x¯i (e.g. language and
computer courses, MBA or CFA, dual studies). Beyond this level of human capital workers are
expected to focus on their job tasks and firms do not permit any training activities at work.
This model structure leads to the existence of two separate submarkets, one where firms are
posting junior positions and anticipate a worker with x = 0 and another one where firms are
posting their senior positions and anticipate workers searching on-the-job and possessing a proof
of sufficient experience. Workers employed in junior positions produce output d1+c1e
γx, whereas
workers employed in senior positions (managers) produce output d2 + c2e
γx, where d1 > d2 and
c1 < c2 as in Gibbons and Waldman (1999). Intuitively, this means that the fixed component
of output dj , j = 1, 2 is falling with a higher hierarchical level, while experience becomes more
important, that is cj , j = 1, 2 is increasing with j. In a symmetric equilibrium all firms choose an
identical promotion cut-off x¯, thus firms correctly anticipate that applicants to senior positions
achieved an experience level x¯ and their output in senior positions is d2 + c2e
γx¯. There is no
experience accumulation in senior positions and output is constant. This is a proxy for decreasing
returns to experience accumulation. Workers employed in senior managerial positions retire at
an exogenous rate ρ. If the manager retires and the junior position is not filled, the firm is empty
and exits the labour market. In our analysis we only consider the steady state, moreover the
entry and exit parameters d and ρ are chosen to keep the population size constant.
Since the focus of the paper is on the optimal promotion decisions of firms and feedback effects
of these decisions on the resulting structure of the labour market, we assume that workers don’t
act strategically in the model and take their behavior as given. Specifically, young workers
7
without experience are always searching for their first job, accumulate experience till the level
specified in their labour contract and start applying to managerial jobs if there is no open
position in their firm. It is a simplifying assumption of the model that there is no labour market
exit among searching workers and those employed in junior positions.
Let 1 − β denote the fraction of output accruing to firms, thus the flow profit is equal to
(1 − β)(dj + cjeγx) depending on the hierarchical level of the position j = 1, 2 and worker’s
experience x. Workers receive a wage wj(x) = βcje
γx, thus lnwj(x) = lnβ + ln cj + γx. This
means that γ can be interpreted as a return to tenure in the model. Output βdj is paid out by
firms as a cost of capital. This shows that wages in our model can grow due to the accumulation
of tenure, internal promotions and between firm transitions. Further, we assume that there is a
profit synergy ∆ if the firm is employing both workers simultaneously, that is, one junior worker
accumulating experience and one senior manager. So the total profit of this firm is given by
(1−β)(d1+c1eγx+d2+c2eγx¯)+∆. Intuitively, this is a synergy from team work because younger
inexperienced workers gain from the advice of senior managers, whereas senior managers may
gain from the innovative new ideas of younger workers.
Variable d00 denotes the stock of empty new firms in the market, whereas d01 is the stock
of firms with a senior manager but no junior worker. Since all these firms have an open junior
position the total stock of open junior positions available for matching is equal to d00+d01. These
positions are randomly matched with zu searching inexperienced workers, where z denotes the
search effort of workers. More precisely, z is the fraction of searching workers who prepare
and send an application at every instant of time. To determine the number of matches in the
submarket for junior positions we use an urn-ball matching mechanism. Suppose some worker
sends an application to one randomly chosen firm, then the probability that a given firm doesn’t
receive this application is 1 − 1d00+d01 . Since workers send their applications independently
without coordination, the probability that this firm doesn’t get any of the zu applications is
given by (1 − 1d00+d01 )zu. Let q1 be the job-filling rate resulting from this application process
and λ1 be the job-finding rate for inexperienced workers. They are given by:
q1 = 1−
(
1− 1
d00 + d01
)zu
λ1 = z
q1(d00 + d01)
zu
= q1
(d00 + d01)
u
(1)
The term q1(d00 + d01) is a total number of matches in the junior market, thus
q1(d00+d01)
zu is a
probability of matching for workers conditional on sending an application in a given matching
round. Multiplying this conditional matching probability with z we obtain the job-finding rate
for junior workers. Further, let d10 denote firms with a junior worker but no senior manager.
This means that the total number of open managerial positions is given by d00 +d10. Finally, let
dN11 denote the stock of full firms with both employees, where the worker in the junior position
is not yet eligible for promotion (x < x¯). In a similar way, dS11 – is the stock of full firms, where
the junior worker is already eligible for senior positions and searching on-the-job. This means
that the stock of applicants in the managerial market is given by zdS11. So the job-filling rate in
the managerial market q2 and the workers’ job-finding rate in this market λ2 are given by:
q2 = 1−
(
1− 1
d00 + d10
)zdS11
λ2 = z
q2(d00 + d10)
zdS11
= q2
(d00 + d10)
dS11
(2)
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Note that we assume the same search intensity parameter z in both markets. This setting can be
generalized to different search intensities for experienced and inexperienced workers, however,
it is not important for our main results. So we keep the model simple and consider only one
search intensity parameter z.
The total number of firms in the market is given by d00 +d01 +d10 +d
N
11 +d
S
11. This notation
also allows us to calculate the number of workers, so normalising the population size to 1 yields:
u+ d10 + d01 + 2d
N
11 + 2d
S
11 = 1
Here e1 = d10 + d
N
11 + d
S
11 is the total number of employees in junior positions, and e2 =
d01 + d
N
11 + d
S
11 is the total number of employees in senior positions.
2.2 Firm Dynamics
Transitions of firms are illustrated in figure 1. Consider changes in the stock of new empty firms
d00. The inflow of new firms into the market is given by n. Since every new firm posts both
the junior and the senior position in the respective submarkets it exits the state d00 whenever it
finds the first employee. So the outflow of firms from d00 takes place at rate q1 +q2. In this paper
we restrict our analysis to the steady states and consider a stationary distribution of workers
and firms across states. This means that d˙00 = 0 in the steady state:
0 = d˙00 = n− (q1 + q2)d00 ⇒ d00 = n
q1 + q2
(3)
The entry of firms into the market is given by n, whereas the exit is ρd01. These are the
firms that lose their only employee due to retirement, which happens at rate ρ. Thus we get
d01 = n/ρ to guarantee a constant number of firms in the market. This is equivalent to the
standard assumption of a constant population of workers.
. . .
. . .
n
d00
q1
q2
ρ
d10(0) d10(x) d10(x¯) d01
q2
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
q2 q2 q2 λ2
dN11(0) d
N
11(x) d
N
11(x¯) d
S
11
q1
Figure 1: Types of firms and their transitions
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Further, consider changes in the stocks of firms d10(x) and d
N
11(x). Note that workers with
experience 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯ are not yet searching on-the-job since their experience is not sufficient for
managerial positions and there are no gains from changing to another junior job. Variable x¯ here
denotes the equilibrium promotion cut-off and will be determined in section 3. This means that
the inflow of firms into state d10(x) is equal to ρd
N
11(x). These are the firms where the manager
retires at rate ρ and they are left with only one junior worker. At the same time ρdN11(x) is the
outflow of firms from the state dN11(x). If the manager retires firms post the open position in the
second submarket for experienced workers and find a manager at rate q2. This means that the
outflow of workers from the state d10(x) is equal to q2d10(x). This is also the inflow of firms into
the state dN11(x). So we get the following system of two first order linear differential equations
3:{
∂d10(x)/∂x = −q2d10(x) + ρdN11(x)
∂dN11(x)/∂x = q2d10(x)− ρdN11(x)
The coefficient matrix of this homogeneous system has eigenvalues 0 and −(ρ+q2), so the general
solution is given by: {
d10(x) = k1ρ+ k2e
−(ρ+q2)x
dN11(x) = k1q2 − k2e−(ρ+q2)x
In order to find the constant terms k1 and k2 we use the following initial conditions: q1d00 =
d10(0) and q1d01 = d
N
11(0). The first condition implies that the stock of firms d10(0) always
consists of new firms finding their first junior worker q1d00. The second condition implies that
the stock of firms dN11(0) consists of firms d01 who find a junior worker, that is q1d01. Using these
initial conditions we find that:
k1 =
q1n(ρ+ q1 + q2)
ρ(ρ+ q2)(q1 + q2)
> 0 k2 = − (q1)
2n
(ρ+ q2)(q1 + q2)
< 0
One can see that k2 < 0, this means that d10(x) is increasing while d
N
11(x) is decreasing in
x. Intuitively this means that the flow ρdN11(x) due to retirement of senior managers always
dominates the flow q2d10(x) implying that finding senior managers is a difficult task for firms in
the considered setting. Note that the sum of two variables is a constant, that is d10(x)+d
N
11(x) =
k1(ρ+ q2) ∀x ∈ [0..x¯].
By integrating variables d10(x) and d
N
11(x) over the interval [0..x¯] we find the total stocks of
firms d10 and d
N
11:
d10 =
∫ x¯
0
d10(x)dx = k1ρx¯+
k2
ρ+ q2
(1− e−(ρ+q2)x¯) (4)
dN11 =
∫ x¯
0
dN11(x)dx = k1q2x¯−
k2
ρ+ q2
(1− e−(ρ+q2)x¯) (5)
3In general the stock variable d10(x, t) may depend on time t, so the total derivative is given by:
∂d10(x, t)
∂x
∂x
∂t
+
∂d10(x, t)
∂t
= −q2d10(x) + ρdN11(x)
Since the distribution of firms d10(x, t) is stationary in the steady state we set the time derivative d˙10 =
∂d10(x,t)
∂t
equal to zero. Moreover, experience x is accumulating one to one with the time because x˙ = ∂x/∂t = 1).
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The remaining unknown stock of firms is dS11. These are the firms with two employees, where
the junior one is already searching for jobs with alternative employers. All firms of type dN11(x¯)
automatically enter the state dS11 since the junior worker starts searching on-the-job upon attain-
ing experience x¯. This is the inflow of workers into the state dS11. At rate ρ the senior manager
retires and the firm promotes the junior worker to the managerial job. In addition, it can also
happen that the junior worker finds a new employer at rate λ2. As one can see from figure 1, in
both cases the firm leaves the state dS11 and enters the stock of firms d01. Hence we get:
0 = d˙S11 = d
N
11(x¯)− (ρ+ λ2)dS11 ⇒ dS11 =
dN11(x¯)
ρ+ λ2
=
k1q2 − k2e−(ρ+q2)x¯
ρ+ λ2
(6)
Finally, recall that u are the young individuals searching for their first job, so that u˙ = d− λ1u.
In the steady state it should be that the inflow into this state d should be equal to the outflow
λ1u, where the outflow are young inexperienced workers finding their first employer. So we get
u = d/λ1. Variable d is the endogenous entry of young individuals, which we can find from
normalising the total population of workers to 1:
d
λ1
= 1− (d10 + d01 + 2dN11 + 2dS11) (7)
Solving jointly the system of equations (2)-(7), d01 = n/ρ, u = d/λ1 we can find the equilibrium
distribution of firms {d00, d10, dN11, dS11, d01}, as well as variables d and u and the equilibrium
transition rates λj , and qj , j = 1, 2. Note that variable x¯ (promotion cut-off) is taken as given
at this stage and will be endogenously derived in section 3.
2.3 Transition rates
We proceed by illustrating the mechanism of our model with a help of a numerical example which
resembles realistic career paths of workers in developed economies. In this section we focus on
the transitions of workers and firms for a given promotion cut-off x¯. One period of time is set to
be one quarter. Consider young workers entering the market at the age of 18 years. Variable z
is the search intensity parameter which is the driving force behind the job-finding rate λ1. We
set z = 0.0146, this corresponds to λ1 = 0.0145 and implies that workers stay in level 0 jobs for
approximately 1/λ1 = 69 quarters or 17.25 years. Intuitively, this means that workers find their
first managerial job on level e1 at the age of 35.25 years on average. In state e1 workers start
accumulating professional managerial experience x. We assume that x¯ = 45, this means it takes
45 quarters or 11.25 years for workers to be eligible for the position of a senior manager. Thus
workers reach the pre-specified necessary level of experience at the age of 46.5 years on average.
Recall that d10(x¯) is a stock of workers who are directly promoted to senior positions within
their firm at every point in time. At the same time dN11(x¯) is a stock of workers eligible for
promotions, however, they can not be promoted directly within their firm since the senior po-
sition is occupied. These workers start searching on the job and enter the accumulated pool of
workers searching and applying to senior positions dS11. So the total stock of workers eligible
for promotion in a given period of time is d10(x¯) + d
N
11(x¯) + d
S
11 = k1(ρ + q2) + d
S
11. Out of
these workers d10(x¯) + (ρ + λ2)d
S
11 are actually promoted, where d10(x¯) + ρd
S
11 are promoted
directly within their firms and λ2d
S
11 make a transition to a senior position in another firm. So
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the average duration of time from the moment of becoming eligible x¯ till the actual promotion
within or between firms is given by:
k1(ρ+ q2) + d
S
11
k1ρ+ k2e−(ρ+q2)x¯ + (ρ+ q2)dS11
In our model this duration is equal to 14 quarters or 3.5 years, so that workers become senior
managers at the age of 50 years on average. This duration is achieved by setting the number
of entering firms n equal to 0.0026. This also implies that the average stock of firms active in
the market is equal to 0.6. So there are on average 600 active firms or 1200 positions per 1000
workers. However, not all of these positions are filled due to the search frictions and experience
requirements. Further, we set ρ = 0.015, so the average time workers spend in senior positions
till retirement is 1/ρ = 66.6 quarters or 16.6 years. So workers retire on average at the age of
66.6 years. Finally, the total population is normalized to 1. Given that the exit rate of workers
is ρ = 0.015, constant size of the population can be achieved by setting d = 0.0052. This means
that 5.2 workers on average enter the market with a population of 1000 workers. Our choice of
parameters at this stage is summarized in table 1. Note that variable x¯ is endogenous in the
overall model, even though we keep it fixed at the current stage of analysis. Endogenous values
of the quarterly transition rates in the steady-state are summarized on the right side of table 1.
Parameter Value Interpretation Variable Value Interpretation
z 0.0146 Search intensity of workers q1 0.0171 Job-filling rate, level 1
ρ 0.0150 Exit/retirement rate q2 0.0036 Job-filling rate, level 2
n 0.0026 Entry of empty firms λ1 0.0145 Job-finding rate, level 1
d 0.0052 Entry of young workers λ2 0.0146 Job-finding rate, level 2
Table 1: Values of exogenous parameters and quarterly transition rates
Table 2 shows the distributions of workers and firms in the steady-state. We can see that
35.7% of all workers remain on average in simple jobs e0. Further, 29.7% are employed in junior
positions e1, where 6.3% of workers are searching on-the-job and applying to senior positions
(dS11). 34.5% of workers occupy senior management positions e2. These numbers imply that
p1 = 0.297/(0.297 + 0.345) = 0.462, that is 46.2% of workers in professional jobs are employed
in junior positons, with the remaining 53.7% being employed in senior positions. Considering
transitions of workers, we can see that 1.2% of e1 workers reach senior positions by changing
employers. Another 5.7% of junior workers are internally promoted within their firms per year.
Even though internal mobility of workers is not intensive, these numbers are close to the empirical
findings. For example, Lluis (2005) finds that in Germany the annual probibility of internal
promotions is 5.7% for relatively young workers with less than 10 years of market experience
and it falls afterwards with an average for all workers groups equal to 2.7%. The same study
reports that internal mobility is more intensive in the US, with 6.7% for men and 6.2% for women
with less than 10 years of experience and 5.0% on average for all men (4.6% for all women). A
more recent study by Cassidy et al. (2016) reports an average probability of internal promotions
equal to 4.6% in Finland.
The left panel of figure 2 shows the stocks of firms d10(x) and d
N
11(x) for different experience
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Variable Value Variable Equation Value
d00 0.1273 Workers in simple jobs e0 = 1− e1 − e2 0.3577
d01 0.1760 Workers in junior jobs e1 = d10 + d
N
11 + d
S
11 0.2966
d10 0.1270 Workers in managerial jobs e2 = d01 + d
S
11 + d
N
11 0.3456
dS11 0.0633 Internally promoted (per year) = (d10(x¯) + ρd
S
11)/e1 0.0576
dN11 0.1063 Job-to-job movers (per year) = λ2d
S
11/e1 0.0124
Table 2: Stationary distributions of workers and firms for parameters from Table 1 and x¯ = 45
levels x of the junior worker. As expected d10(x) is increasing, while d
N
11(x) is decreasing with x.
Note that the starting ratio of these two stocks is d10(0)/d
N
11(0) = ρ/(q1 + q2) but the long-run
ratio for larger values of x is: limx→∞ d10(x)/ limx→∞ dN11(x) = ρ/q2. So the ratio is clearly
increasing with higher experience levels. At the same time we know that the sum of these two
stocks is fixed and equal to k1(ρ + q2) and each of them is a monotonous function of x. This
confirms again that d10(x) should be increasing. So as workers accumulate more and more
experience they are more likely to find themselves in a situation with an open senior position.
The reason is that senior managers retire over time, but the probability of substituting them
with an external candidate is relatively low.
Figure 2: Left panel: Numbers of firms with only one worker in the junior position d10(x) and
with two (non-searching) workers dN11(x) as a function of worker’s experience x (x¯ = 45). Right
panel: Fractions of workers employed in the junior level p1 = e1/(e1 + e2) and in the senior level
p2 = 1− p1 depending on the promotion cut-off x¯
The right panel of figure 2 shows comparative statics results with respect to the promotion
cut-off x¯. We vary this variable in the range [30..60] quarters or [7.5..15] years, with the bench-
mark value x¯ = 45, that is 11.25 years. We can see that earlier promotions reduce the fraction of
workers in junior positions p1 and increase the fraction of workers in senior positions p2 = 1−p1.
If we consider the implications of earlier promotions for the pool of applicants to senior positions
then there are two counteracting effect. If there are many open senior vacancies in the economy
then a smaller x¯ will lead to many internal promotions, so the pool of external applicants to
senior positions will diminish. But on the other hand, if the number of senior positions is lim-
ited and internal promotions are rare, a smaller x¯ will increase the pool of external applicants to
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senior positions. We find that the second effect is dominating in our setting. This is a general
equilibrium effect, which is not anticipated by individual firms when they choose their optimal
promotion cut-off.
The left panel of figure 3 shows changes in the mobility of workers between levels 1 and 2
with respect to the promotion cut-off x¯. Later promotions reduce the intensity of transitions
from junior to senior positions. Both internal promotions and job-to-job transitions are less
frequent with a higher promotion cut-off. This is because workers have to wait for the experience
evaluation by firms certifying their skills to other employers. The same figure (right axis) also
illustrates the relative fraction of internally promoted workers, we obtain it by dividing the
number of promoted workers d10(x¯) + ρd
S
11 with a total number of workers making it to the
senior position λ2d
S
11 + d10(x¯) + ρd
S
11. We can see that this relative fraction is increasing from
77% when x¯ = 25 to 86% when x¯ = 65. This reveals an unusual general equilibrium effect in
our model. If some firm i decides to delay internal promotions and wants to hire more senior
managers on the external market it sets a higher cut-off value x¯i. However, if all firms follow the
same strategy and set a higher cut-off x¯ then the relative fraction of senior managers reaching
senior positions via internal promotions is increasing. Thus internal promotions become a more
important source of upward mobility for workers even though the individual intention of every
firm is different4. The reason is that with a higher experience requirement x¯, there are less
applicants in the external market, so the job-to-job mobility rate declines stronger then the
internal promotion rate.
Figure 3: Selected variables for different values of the promotion cut-off x¯ and search intensity
z. Left panel: Fractions of internally promoted workers (d10(x¯)+ρd
S
11)/e1 and job-to-job movers
λ2d
S
11/e1 per year. Right panel: Annual job-filling rates q1 and q2.
The right panel of figure 3 shows changes in the job-filling rates q1 and q2. More intensive
job search by workers makes it easier for firms to fill their open positions, so q1 and q2 are both
increasing in z. But there are adverse effects of the promotion cut-off x¯. Later promotions reduce
4This is illustrated in figure 15 in Appendix B. We simulate the relative fraction of internally promoted workers
of a single firm i for varying x¯i while keeping the promotion cut-off of all other firms constant. By delaying internal
promotions firm i is able to hire more senior workers from the market if other firms don’t change their strategy.
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the pool of competing vacancies on level 1. Reduced competition of firms in this submarket
improves their hiring chances, so the job-filling rate q1 is increasing with x¯. There is an opposite
effect in the second submarket for experienced workers. Delayed promotions reduce the pool of
applicants for senior positions which leads to the lower job-filling rate q2.
3 Optimal promotion by firms
3.1 Firm’s best response
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the optimal promotion time chosen by an individual
firm. Denoting by J00(x¯i, x¯) the present value of a firm starting to search for a worker, i.e. a firm
with neither a junior nor a senior level worker, which uses a promotion threshold x¯i, whereas all
other firms on the market promote at x¯. When a new firm opens it has to choose its promotion
strategy and the optimal choice is given by
x¯∗i (x¯) = arg max
x¯i≥0
J00(x¯i, x¯). (8)
In order to analyze this optimization problem the value function J00 has to be determined. When
entering the market the firm has two open positions – one junior and one senior – so the firm is
searching for workers in both markets simultaneously and has a double cost 2s. Therefore,
rJ00(x¯i, x¯) = −2s+ q1(J10(0|x¯i, x¯)− J00) + q2(J01(x¯|x¯i, x¯)− J00),
where J10(x|x¯i, x¯) is the present value for a firm with only one junior worker, whose experience is
x, and no senior level worker and J01(y|x¯i, x¯) is the present value for a firm with only one senior
level worker, whose experience is y, and no junior worker. If the firm first finds an inexperienced
worker, which happens at rate q1 it moves to the state J10(0), since we know that x = 0. In
contrast, if the firm first finds a senior manager which happens at rate q2 it moves to the state
J01(x¯) since we know that all managers in the senior market have experience x¯.
To determine J10(x|x¯i, x¯) let JN11(x, y|x¯i, x¯) be the present value of profits for a firm with a
worker, whose experience is x, and a manager with experience y. Note that both value functions
indirectly depend on the promotion cut-off x¯i chosen by firm i and on the market experience level
x¯ chosen by competing firms. Let pi1(x) = (d1 + c1e
γx)(1− β) and pi2(y) = (d2 + c2eγy)(1− β)
denote the flow profits obtained by the firm from a filled junior and senior position respectively.
The present value J10(x|x¯i, x¯) is given by the following equation:
rJ10(x|x¯i, x¯) = pi1(x)− s+ q2(JN11(x, x¯|x¯i, x¯)− J10(x|x¯i, x¯)) +
∂J10(x|x¯i, x¯)
∂x
(9)
The firm receives a flow profit pi1(x) by employing its worker in the junior position and the
worker is accumulating experience x. In addition, the firm pays a flow cost s for posting a
vacancy in the market for experienced workers. At rate q2 the firm is successful in this market
and moves to the state JN11(x, x¯|x¯i, x¯), where x¯ is the market level of experience set by other
firms and guaranteeing workers’ eligibility for senior positions. For the ease of exposition in the
following we use J10(x) for J10(x|x¯i, x¯) and JN11(x, y) for JN11(x, y|x¯i, x¯) and omit the indirect
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dependence on {x¯i, x¯} in other value functions. We come back to the explicit notation when we
determine the optimal promotion time x¯∗i of firm i and the equilibrium value of x¯ in the end of
this section.
Next consider the present value JN11(x, y), where x is the current experience of the worker in
the junior position and y is the constant experience level of the manager. Note that y = x¯ if the
manager was hired in the market but it can be different from x¯ if the manager was promoted
within the firm:
rJN11(x, y) = pi1(x) + ∆ + pi2(y)− ρ(JN11(x, y)− J10(x)) +
∂JN11(x, y)
∂x
Here the firm receives additional profit ∆ from teamwork, but may lose the manager due to
retirement which happens at rate ρ. Let ∆J(x, x¯) = JN11(x, x¯)−J10(x) be the capital gain of the
firm from filling a senior position in the market which guarantees experience y = x¯, so that
(r + ρ+ q2)∆J(x, x¯) = pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s+
∂∆J(x, x¯)
∂x
The general solution of this first order linear differential equation is given by:
∆J(x, x¯) =
pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s
r + ρ+ q2
+Ke(r+ρ+q2)x
where K is the integration constant. This equation shows that the capital gain from hiring a
manager in the market has three componets: (1) the firm receives the flow profit pi2(x¯) and (2)
the additional profit ∆ from team work and (3) the firm saves the cost of posting a vacancy s.
Next insert ∆J(x, x¯) into equation (9), this yields:
rJ10(x) = pi1(x)− s+ q2 (pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)
r + ρ+ q2
+ q2Ke
(r+ρ+q2)x +
∂J10(x)
∂x
(10)
This allows us to find the general solution for the present value of profits J10(x) (with A de-
noting the integration constant, see Appendix A for the derivation) and JN11(x, x¯). Recall that
JN11(x, x¯) = ∆J(x, x¯) + J10(x), so we get:
J10(x) =
d1(1− β)− s
r
+ q2
(pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+Aerx +
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ −
q2Ke
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
JN11(x, x¯) =
(pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)(r + q2)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+
ρKe(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
+
d1(1− β)− s
r
+Aerx +
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ
Next consider J01(y), which is the present value of profits for a firm with only one manager,
whose experience level is y:
rJ01(y) = pi2(y)− ρJ01(y)− s+ q1(JN11(0, y)− J01(y))
The firm receives the flow profit pi2(y) = (d2 + c2e
γy)(1 − β) generated by the manager and is
continuously posting a vacancy in the market for junior workers, which is associated with a flow
cost s. At rate q1 the firm is successful in this market and moves to the state J
N
11(0, y). This is
because applicants to junior positions are young and inexperienced with x = 0. Finally, at rate
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ρ the firm may lose the senior manager and remains empty. All empty firms exit the market.
Rewrite J01(y) in the following way:
J01(y) =
pi2(y)− s+ q1JN11(0, y)
r + ρ+ q1
The last state for the firm is when the junior worker has already accumulated experience nec-
essary for promotion. Recall that x¯i denotes promotion cut-off of some arbitrary firm i. This
means that the junior worker obtains experience evaluation and becomes eligible for senior po-
sitions having accumulated experience x¯i. This promotion cut-off is chosen by the firm upon
signing the employment contract. If the senior position is open in firm i, the worker with x = x¯i
is promoted immediately . However, it is also possible that the senior position is occupied, so
the worker starts searching for alternative employment. Let Js11(x¯i, y) be the present value of
profits for a firm with a searching worker whose experience is (x¯i) and a manager (y):
rJs11(x¯i, y) = pi1(x¯i) + ∆ + pi2(y)− ρ(Js11(x¯i, y)− J01(x¯i))− λ2(Js11(x¯i, y)− J01(y))
This equation shows the following. The firm obtains the flow profit generated by both workers
pi1(x¯i) + pi2(y) and additional profit ∆ from teamwork. At rate ρ the manager may retire, so
the searching worker is promoted to the senior position and the firm moves to the state J01(x¯i).
Alternatively, it may happen that the worker finds alternative employment and quits at rate λ2.
In this case the firm is left with only one manager and the present value of profits is J01(y).
Next we know that other firms promote their workers at x¯, so all managers hired in the market
have experience y = x¯. Then JS11(x¯i, x¯) is given by:
JS11(x¯i, x¯) =
pi1(x¯i) + ∆ + pi2(x¯) + ρJ01(x¯i) + λ2J01(x¯)
r + ρ+ λ2
In order to find the two integration constants A and K we use the following two boundary
conditions: J10(x¯i) = J01(x¯i) and J
N
11(x¯i, x¯) = J
S
11(x¯i, x¯). The first condition says that firms are
committed to promote the worker upon experience x¯i if the senior position is open, so the present
value of the firm changes from J10(x¯i) to J01(x¯i). The second condition says that workers with
experience x¯i stop accumulating experience and start searching for alternative jobs at x¯i if the
senior position is filled, so the present value of the firm is changing from JN11(x¯i, x¯) to J
S
11(x¯i, x¯).
The first boundary condition J10(x¯i) = J01(x¯i) can be written as:
J10(x¯i) =
d1(1− β)− s
r
+ q2
pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+Aerx¯i +
c1(1− β)eγx¯i
r − γ −
q2Ke
(r+ρ+q2)x¯i
ρ+ q2
=
pi2(x¯i)− s+ q1JN11(0, x¯i)
r + ρ+ q1
= J01(x¯i)
The second boundary condition JN11(x¯i, x¯) = J
S
11(x¯i, x¯) becomes:
JN11(x¯i, x¯) =
(pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)(r + q2)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+
ρKe(r+ρ+q2)x¯i
ρ+ q2
+
d1(1− β)− s
r
+Aerx¯i +
c1(1− β)eγx¯i
r − γ
=
pi1(x¯i) + ∆ + pi2(x¯)
r + ρ+ λ2
+
ρ(pi2(x¯i)− s+ q1JN11(0, x¯i))
(r + ρ+ λ2)(r + ρ+ q1)
+
λ2(pi2(x¯)− s+ q1JN11(0, x¯))
(r + ρ+ λ2)(r + ρ+ q1)
= JS11(x¯i, x¯)
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Note that one term which is still unknown in both boundary conditions is JN11(0, x¯i). We derive
this term in Appendix A. Solving these two boundary conditions for A and K we can see that
both variables depend on the individual decision of firm i and on the behavior of other firms x¯,
that is A(x¯i, x¯) and K(x¯i, x¯).
Based on this analysis we can now write the firm’s optimization problem (8) as
x¯∗i (x¯) = arg max
x¯i≥0
[q1J10(0|{x¯, A(x¯i, x¯),K(x¯i, x¯)}) + q2J01(x¯|{x¯, A(x¯i, x¯),K(x¯i, x¯)})],
where we show explicitly the arguments of functions J10(0) and J01(x¯). The solution of this
maximization problem gives the optimal response function x¯i(x¯) of firm i. Since firms are
homogeneous with respect to their profit functions, they all have identical optimal response
functions. In light of this in what follows we restrict our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria
and impose the equilibrium condition x¯∗i (x¯) = x¯ to find the equilibrium promotion time x¯.
3.2 Partial and general equilibrium
The complexity of the expressions derived for J10 and J01 makes an analytical characterization
of the best response function and the resulting equilibrium infeasible, even if we consider a
partial equilibrium with fixed transition rates. Therefore, we illustrate the main properties
of the best response function and the equilibrium by extending the calibration of our model
developed in Section 2.3 (Table 1) and carrying out a numerical analysis. First, we consider a
partial equilibrium framework with fixed transition rates {q1, q2, λ1, λ2}, with the corresponding
values from table 1. We choose the annual discount rate equal to 4%, so that r = 0.01. We
also take a standard value of the bargaining power β = 0.5 following Pissarides and Petrongolo
(2001) and Pissarides (2009). The flow cost of an open vacancy is set low (s = 0.1), as it is not
in the focus of our analysis. Further, parameters d2 < d1 and c2 > c1 are calibrated so that
x¯ = 45, corresponding to a promotion time of 11.25 years, is an equilibrium outcome of the
overall model. Even though it is an endogenous variable in the complete model, we keep it fixed
in this section and analyse the optimal response of a single firm i. We start with a benchmark
value ∆ = 0 and postpone the analysis of production complementarities to the next section.
We set the rate of return to tenure at 1.2% per year, which yields γ = 0.003 on the quarterly
basis. According to Farber (1999) the usual OLS estimate of the return to tenure in the United
States is 2% per year with the same employer. Empirical methods generally separate this number
into two parts: 1. human capital accumulation within the firm and 2. selection component due
to the fact that high ability workers stay longer in their jobs and earn more. Farber (1999) finds
that 1.5% of the return to tenure is due to the accumulation of human capital and only 0.5%
due to selection. In a more recent study Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen (2003) report the
same 2% return to tenure in Denmark, but the human capital component is estimated only at
0.5% per year. These numbers reveal that our parameter choice – 1.2% per year due to human
capital accumulation within the firm – is in the middle range of the existing empirical estimates.
Moreover, it coincides with the return to tenure estimated by Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2018) for
Germany. The second set of parameters is summarized in table 3 below:
Figure 4 shows the objective function of firm i – J00(x¯i) – for a fixed market promotion time
x¯ = 45 and for fixed transition rates {q1, q2, λ1, λ2} (left panel). We can see that promoting junior
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Value Interpretation Value Interpretation
r 0.010 Quarterly discount rate γ 0.003 Quarterly return to tenure
β 0.500 Bargaining power s 0.100 Flow cost of an open vacancy
c1 0.500 Slope parameter, level 1 c2 2.000 Slope parameter, level 2
d1 0.200 Intercept parameter, level 1 d2 0.100 Intercept parameter, level 2
Table 3: Values of exogenous parameters
workers too early is not optimal for the firm. This is despite the fact that d1 +c1 < d2 +c2, which
means that the flow profit of the firm is higher in the senior position even if the worker doesn’t
possess any managerial experience and x = 0. The reason is that firms are forward-looking
and anticipate a larger gain from promotion once the worker accumulated some managerial
experience. At the same time waiting too long is also suboptimal for the firm because the
foregone profit is increasing. This is the indirect cost of delayed promotions. In addition, there
is the direct flow cost of an open vacancy in the senior position s. As can be clearly seen for our
considered parameter values the optimal promotion time is x¯∗i (45) = 45.
Figure 4: Left panel: Objective function of firm i and the optimal choice x¯∗i (x¯) for a fixed market
promotion cut-off x¯ = 45 and fixed transition rates. Right panel: Optimal response function
x¯∗i (x¯) for different values of x¯, comparative statics with respect to the job-filling rates q1 and q2
The right panel of figure 4 shows the optimal response function x¯∗i (x¯) for different values of
the market promotion time x¯ and fixed transition rates (black solid curve). We can see that firm
i has strong incentives to delay promotions if other firms in the market promote their junior
workers later. Higher x¯ implies that managers applying externally are more experienced, so the
quality of the candidate pool in the managerial market is better. In this situation it is optimal
for firm i to wait longer because the marginal gain from waiting is increasing with x¯ due to the
better quality of external candidates. Hence, we obtain that there is strategic complementarity
between the promotion times of the different firms in the market.
Further, we consider the effect of increasing the job-filling rate q1 keeping fixed all other
transition rates. So it becomes easier for firms to fill their junior positions. The right panel of
figure 4 shows that the optimal response curve x¯∗i (x¯) is shifting downwards for all x¯. Note that
s/q1 is the average cost of an open junior position because s is the cost per unit time and 1/q1
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is the average duration of the vacancy. Higher q1 lowers the cost of open junior positions, so
it is optimal for the firm to promote its junior worker earlier. The opposite is true when we
increase q2, so the optimal response curve x¯
∗
i (x¯) is shifting upwards for all x¯. In this case open
senior positions become cheaper because s/q2 is decreasing, so firm i finds it optimal to delay
promotions. This shows that the two positions are substitutes from the perspective of the firm.
We already know that x¯∗i = x¯
pe = 45 for all firms i is a symmetric partial equilibrium of the
model for the given transition rates (values from table 1). But is it a unique partial equilibrium?
Figure 5 shows that in addition to the low equilibrium x¯pel = 45 there also exists a second partial
equilibrium with x¯peh = 157.6 for these transition rates. Both equilibria are illustrated on the
right panel of figure 5. In light of the strategic complementarity between the optimal promotion
times of the firms it is not surprising that multiple equilibria exist in our model. However, as
can be clearly seen in right panel of figure 5 only the low equilibrium is strategically stable. Any
best response dynamics initialized with a market promotion level x¯ ∈ [0, x¯peh ] converges to the
lower equilibrium x¯pel = 45.
Figure 5: Left panel: Objective function of firm i for x¯ = 157.6. Right panel: Optimal response
curve x¯∗i (x¯) exhibiting the two partial equilibria x¯
pe
l = 45 and x¯
pe
h = 157.6 for fixed transition
rates from table 1
In Section 2.3 we have shown that if all firms use a promotion threshold of x¯ = 45, then the
transition rates under the stationary distribution are given by {q1 = 0.0171, q2 = 0.0036, λ1 =
0.0145, λ2 = 0.0146} (see Table 1). Since these are exactly the transition rates under which we
have carried out the partial equilibrium analysis above, it follows directly that x¯∗i = x¯
pe
l = 45, i ∈
[0, 1] is also a general equilibrium of the model. Similarly to the partial equilibrium setting, also
with endogenous transition rates a second equilibrium with a very high promotion threshold
exists, which however is unstable. Hence in what follows we focus on the lower equilibrium and
in the following section examine how the equilibrium promotion threshold changes in response
to a variation of key parameters in the model.
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3.3 Comparative statics: partial and general equilibrium effects
Based on the benchmark numerical example developed in the previous section we now address
two key questions of our study: (1) how promotion chances of junior workers are affected if there
exist production complementarities and synergies from the team work and (2) what is the link
between the optimal promotion time and the skill level of the worker?
In order to address the first question we gradually increase the synergy parameter ∆, which
was fixed at 0 in the benchmark case. This is illustrated on the left panel of figure 6. If the
synergy parameter is increasing from 0 to 0.6 the promotion cut-off x¯ge in the general equilibrium
is decreasing from 45 down to 43.7. Stronger complementarities in the production process create
stronger incentives for firms to employ a full team of two employees rather than having open
vacancies. In our setting the job-filling rate in the junior market q1 = 0.0171 is substantially
higher than the job-filling rate in the senior market q2 = 0.0036 which means that hiring junior
workers is easier than senior managers. In this situation firms prefer earlier promotions of junior
employees in the hope that the junior position will be filled faster than the senior position and
the firm can gain additional profits from the team production process. Note that this gain comes
at the expense of accepting less experienced senior managers.
General
equilibrium
effect
Direct
effect
Competition
effect
Figure 6: Left panel: Equilibrium promotion time x¯i(.) as a function of the synergy parameter
∆. Right panel: Equilibrium promotion time x¯i(.) as a function of the skill parameter c2
Further, we decompose this effect into three parts. We write the individually optimal pro-
motion threshold x¯∗i (x¯, ζ,∆) as a function of the market promotion level x¯ as well as the vector
of transition rates ζ and the synergy parameter ∆. Furthermore, x¯pe(ζ,∆) denotes the (partial)
equilibrium market cutoff under transitions rates ζ and ζ∆ the general equilibrium transition
rates for the synergy parameter ∆. The general equilibrium cutoff under synergy ∆ is then
denoted as x¯ge(∆) := x¯pe(ζ∆,∆). Hence x¯∗i (x¯
pe(ζ0, 0), ζ0, 0) = x¯pe(ζ0, 0) = x¯ge(0) = 45. Using
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this notation we obtain the following decomposition of the effect of a change in ∆:
x¯ge(0)− x¯ge(∆) = x¯pe(ζ0, 0)− x¯pe(ζ∆,∆) = x¯∗i (x¯pe(ζ0, 0), ζ, 0)− x¯∗i (x¯pe(ζ∆,∆), ζ∆,∆) =
= [x¯∗i (x¯
pe(ζ0, 0), ζ0, 0)− x¯∗i (x¯pe(ζ0, 0), ζ0,∆)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+ [x¯∗i (x¯
pe(ζ0, 0), ζ0,∆)− x¯∗i (x¯pe(ζ0,∆), ζ0,∆)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Competition effect
+ [x¯∗i (x¯
pe(ζ0,∆), ζ0,∆)− x¯∗i (x¯pe(ζ∆,∆), ζ∆,∆)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
General equilibrium effect
First, figure 6 (left panel) shows the direct effect, this is a change in the optimal promotion
time of firm i as a function of ∆ in a setting with constant environment. As we can see from
the figure, the firm has very strong incentives to promote earlier. If the synergy parameter is
increasing from 0 to 0.6 the optimal promotion cut-off of firm i is decreasing from 45 down to
41 (black curve). So the direct effect for ∆ = 0.6 is equal to 4 = 45 − 41. Second, we allow
for changes in the behavior of competing firms x¯pe(ζ0,∆) but keep the set of transition rates ζ0
fixed. This is the competition effect. We already know from figure 4 that earlier promotions by
the competitors lead to earlier promotions of firm i. This is illustrated by the red curve on figure
6. If the synergy parameter is increasing from 0 to 0.6 and the firm takes earlier promotions
of competitiors into account the optimal promotion cut-off is decreasing even stronger from 41
down to 40.3, so the competition effect is equal to 0.7 = 41 − 40.3. It makes promotions more
sensitive to the production complementarity ∆. The sum of these two effects would be observed
in a partial equilibrium setting, in which the transition rates are kept constant. Third, we
analyze the general equilibrium effect and allow for the endogenous changes in the transition
rates. From figure 3 we already know that if all firms set earlier promotion times then q1 is
decreasing and q2 is increasing. Intuitively, this means that earlier promotions make it easier
for firms to hire senior managers but hiring junior workers becomes more difficult. This general
equilibrium effect mitigates the incentives of firm i to promote earlier and makes promotions
less sensitive to the production complementarity ∆. The general equilibrium effect is illustrated
by the blue curve and is equal to −3.4 = 40.3 − 43.7. Based on this decomposition we can
conclude that the direct effect and the general equilibrium effect are quantitatively larger than
the competition effect in our setting.
Next we turn to the effect of education. We proxy this effect by changes in the parameter
c2. The intuition behind this proxy is that more educated workers with higher skills will be
more productive in senior positions than low skill workers even if they have similar practical
experience. This is due to the methodological competence, broader knowledge and problem-
solving skills associated with higher education. Following this logic we assume that higher c2
corresponds to the labour market with more educated workers but there are no productivity
differences in junior jobs (c1). The right panel of figure 6 shows changes in the promotion times
where c2 = 2 is the benchmark case in the middle of the figure. We can see that higher education
generally leads to earlier promotions. The effects are reversed when the labour force is less
qualified: if c2 is decreasing from 2 to 1.95, firm i responds by setting the equilibrium promotion
time equal to 49.2 in a constant environment. If all competitors follow the same strategy and
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set longer promotion times the partial equilibrium is achieved at x¯∗i (x¯
pe) = x¯pe = 51. The
decomposition reveals again that the general equilibrium effect dampens the direct effect of the
parameter change on the optimal promotion time and makes it less sensitive to the education
parameter. We obtain for c2 = 1.95 a general equilibrium cut-off of x¯
ge = 46.3. Even though this
result provides first evidence of the positive link between education and the speed of promotions
in our model, it is only a comparative statics result and it is not clear if it will be confirmed in
a setting where two skill types are mixed in the same labour market. We continue this analysis
in the next section.
4 Two skill levels
4.1 Optimal promotion with two skill levels
In this section we extend the model to the setting with two skill groups and analyze the spillover
effects that the presence of one skill group imposes on the other group. To keep the model
tractable we refrain from the synergy effect and set ∆ = 0 throughout this extension. Let cL2
be the education parameter of low skill workers. Once employed in the senior job they generate
the flow profit piL2 (x) = (d2 + c
L
2 e
γx)(1−β) for the firm. Further, cH2 > cL2 denotes the education
parameter of high skill workers, so they generate the flow profit piH2 (x) = (d2 +c
H
2 e
γx)(1−β). We
assume that the difference between cL2 and c
H
2 is sufficiently small so that firms do not reject low
skill applicants. Moreover, c1 remains the same for both worker groups indicating that high and
low skill workers are equally productive when performing junior level jobs. It is the difference in
managerial abilities that we want to capture in this extension. Let a denote the fraction of low
skill workers in the population. Variables x¯Li and x¯
H
i denote the promotion times set by firm i
for each skill group respectively. As before this decision is made upon the entry and there is full
commitment on the side of the firm.
Further, let α1 denote the fraction of low skill applicants in the junior market and α2 be the
fraction of low skill applicants in the senior market. Consider some firm with an inexperienced
worker of skill j = L,H employed in the junior position and an open vacancy on the senior level.
The present value of discounted future profits of this firm is denoted by Jj0 and given by:
rJj0(x) = pi1(x)− s+ q2[α2JNjL(x, x¯L) + (1− α2)JNjH(x, x¯H)− Jj0(x)] +
∂Jj0(x)
∂x
(11)
With probability α2 the firm will hire another low skill worker for the senior position, which
generates the present value of profits JNjL(x, x¯L), while with the opposite probability 1− α2 the
firm will hire a high skill worker which generates the present value of profits JNjH(x, x¯H). Note
here that x¯j denotes the market experience level of applicants in the managerial market with a
skill level j = L,H. Variables JNjf (x, y), j, f = L,H can be found as:
rJNjf (x, y) = pi1(x) + pi
f
2 (y)− ρ(JNjf (x, y)− Jj0(x)) +
∂JNjf (x, y)
∂x
(12)
Here pif2 (y) is the flow profit generated by the senior manager who may retire and exit the market
at rate ρ. In this case the firm is left with the inexperienced junior worker and the corresponding
present value Jj0(x). Further, we define an auxilliary variable J¯j(x) ≡ α2JNjL(x, x¯L) + (1 −
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α2)J
N
jH(x, x¯H) which is a weighted average between the two present values and is given by:
rJ¯j(x) = pi1(x) + α2pi
L
2 (x¯L) + (1− α2)piH2 (x¯H)− ρ(J¯j(x)− Jj0(x)) +
∂J¯j(x)
∂x
(13)
Note that formally, J¯j(x, x¯L, x¯H) depends on x¯L and x¯H but this dependence is suppressed for
the ease of exposition. Equation (11) can then be written as:
rJj0(x) = pi1(x)− s+ q2[J¯j(x)− Jj0(x)] + ∂Jj0(x)
∂x
(14)
In addition, define another auxilliary variable ∆Jj(x) ≡ J¯j(x)−Jj0(x), this is the average present
value gain of finding a manager. Taking difference between equations (13) and (14) it becomes:
(r + ρ+ q2)∆Jj(x) = α2pi
L
2 (x¯L) + (1− α2)piH2 (x¯H) + s+
∂∆Jj(x)
∂x
The general solution of this first order linear differential equation is:
∆Jj(x) =
α2pi
L
2 (x¯L) + (1− α2)piH2 (x¯H) + s
r + ρ+ q2
+Kje
(r+ρ+q2)x (15)
where Kj is the integration constant. Let p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H) = α2pi
L
2 (x¯L) + (1 − α2)piH2 (x¯H) denote
the average flow profit of the firm associated with hiring a manager in the market. With this
notation we can rewrite equation (14) for Jj0(x) by inserting ∆Jj(x) in the following way:
rJj0(x) = pi1(x)− s+ q2
[ p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H) + s
r + ρ+ q2
+Kje
(r+ρ+q2)x
]
+
∂Jj0(x)
∂x
(16)
With Aj denoting the integration constant, the general solution of this differential equation can
be written as:
Jj0(x) =
d1(1− β)− s
r
+ q2
p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H) + s
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+Aje
rx +
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ −
q2Kje
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
(17)
Finally, inserting Jj0(x) into equation (12) we get the last differential equation for J
N
jf (x, y)
which allows us to solve the main part of the model (see Appendix A for the derivation):
JNjf (x, y) =
d1(1− β)− s
r
+
pif2 (y)
r + ρ
+
ρq2p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
+
s(r + q2)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
(18)
+ Aje
rx +
c1(1− β)eγx
(r − γ) +
ρKje
(r+ρ+q2)x
(ρ+ q2)
+Djfe
(r+ρ)x (19)
where Djf is the corresponding integration constant. Evaluating J
N
jL(x, y) at y = x¯L with the
corresponding term DjL, J
N
jH(x, y) at y = x¯H with the corresponding term DjH and taking a
weighted average between the two we get α2J
N
jL(x, x¯L)+(1−α2)JNjH(x, x¯H) = J¯j(x) = ∆Jj(x)+
Jj0(x). In Appendix A we show that this equation implies that α2DjL + (1− α2)DjH = 0.
In the next step we consider the last Bellman equations for firms with experienced junior
workers and senior managers. Let J0f (y) denote the present value of future profits for a firm
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with only one senior manager whose experience is y:
rJ0f (y) = pi
f
2 (y)− s− ρJ0f (y) + q1[α1JNLf (0, y) + (1− α1)JNHf (0, y)− J0f (y)]
With probability α1 the firm fills its junior position with a low skill worker, while with probability
(1−α1) the open position is filled with a high skill worker. The last state that we have to take into
account is JSjf (x, y), where the junior worker accumulated sufficient experience and is already
searching for senior positions in competing firms. It is given by:
rJSjf (x, y) = pi1(x) + pi
f
2 (y)− ρ(Jsjf (x, y)− J0j(x))− λ2(Jsjf (x, y)− J0f (y))
If the senior manager retires, the remaining worker is promoted to the senior position, so the
firm ends up with a present value of profits J0j(x). In contrast, if the junior worker quits the
firm ends up with a present value of profits J0f (y).
As before we impose several boundary conditions:
Jj0(x¯
j
i ) = J0j(x¯
j
i ) J
N
jf (x¯
j
i , x¯f ) = J
S
jf (x¯
j
i , x¯f ) j, f = L,H
These conditions imply that firms commit to promoting workers whenever they reach a pre-
specified skill-specific experience level x¯ji depending on their skills j = L,H. However, if the
senior position is filled the worker starts searching on-the-job. Combining this set of 6 equations
with 2 equations α2DjL + (1 − α2)DjH = 0 we can find a vector of 8 integration constants
{Aj ,Kj , Djf} for the optimal skill-specific promotion times x¯ji of firm i and market experience
cut-offs x¯j .
In the final step we consider the objective function of firm i. Given that the firm has to
determine its startegy upon the entry, it aims at maximizing the present value of expected
future profits J00 given by:
rJ00 = −2s+ q1[α1JL0(0) + (1− α1)JH0(0)− J00] + q2[α2J0L(x¯L) + (1− α2)J0H(x¯H)− J00]
This equation shows that there are four sources of uncertainty for the firm at this stage: which
position will be filled first – junior or senior – and which type of worker will be hired – high or
low skilled. The choice variables of the firm are x¯Li and x¯
H
i which are the promotion cut-offs for
each of the two skill groups. The firm solves the optimization problem
{x¯L∗i , x¯H∗i } = arg max
x¯Li ,x¯
H
i
q1[α1JL0(0|{x¯Li , x¯Hi , x¯L, x¯H}) + (1− α1)JH0(0|{x¯Li , x¯Hi , x¯L, x¯H})]
+ q2[α2J0L(x¯L|{x¯Li , x¯Hi , x¯L, x¯H}) + (1− α2)J0H(x¯H |{x¯Li , x¯Hi , x¯L, x¯H})] (20)
where {x¯L∗i , x¯H∗i } denote the optimal choices. As before we consider symmetric equilibria, so
that x¯L∗i (x¯L, x¯H) = x¯L and x¯
H∗
i (x¯L, x¯H) = x¯H which guarantee that firms do not have incentives
to deviate.
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4.2 Partial equilibrium
To illustrate the implications of skill heterogeneity for our results we first consider again a partial
equilibrium framework with fixed transition rates from table 1. We set cL2 = 1.95 and c
H
2 = 2.05,
so that high skill workers are more productive than low skill workers in senior jobs. From our
analysis in section 3.3 we know that for these parameters and the transition rates emerging
from our default setting (see Table 1), in the absence of high-skill workers (i.e. α1 = α2 = 1),
the partial equilibrium promotion threshold for low skill workers is x¯peL = 51. We start with a
situation when α1 = α2 = 0.7, which implies that 70% of workers in the market are low skilled.
For comparison, Albrecht and Vroman (2002) use a close value of 67%, while in the model by
Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2017) the fraction of low skill workers is taken at 60%. The left panel
of figure 7 shows the objective function of the firm for the default transition rates. We find that
the partial equilibrium is achieved for x¯peL = 59.7 and x¯
pe
H = 28.4, which implies that high skill
workers are promoted much earlier than low skill workers. Intuitively, a firm with a low skill
worker in a junior position has a strong incentive to delay the promotion of this worker because
this delay increases the chance for the firm to hire a high skill worker from the market for the
senior position. Quite on the contrary, if the junior worker has high skills then it is profitable for
the firm to exploit these skills in the senior position rather than hiring from the market which
comes at the risk of putting a low skill worker into the senior position.
Figure 7: Left panel: Two-dimensional objective function of the firm in the space {x¯Li , x¯Hi } for
α1 = α2 = 0.7 and market promotion cut-offs of x¯L = 59.7, x¯H = 28.4. Right panel: Sequence
of partial equilibria for different values of α = α1 = α2.
In the right panel of figure 7 we illustrate the nature of the partial equilibrium in the model
with two worker groups. First, we find the optimal promotion cut-offs for high skill workers
x¯H∗i (x¯H , x¯
L
i = x¯L) = x¯H for any given promotion cut-off of low skill workers x¯
L
i = x¯L. If we
exogenously decrease x¯Li = x¯L we can see that firms respond by later promotions of high skill
workers (black dashed curve). Considering the left panel of figure 7 we can see that this negative
dependence of the optimal threshold for xLi respectively x
H
i from the value of the other threshold
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also arises if we keep the thresholds of all other firms constant. Intuitively, faster promotion of
own low-skill workers makes it more likely that the firm’s senior position is filled at any point in
time. A firm never wants to provide experience evaluation to high-skill workers and make them
eligible for promotion at a point in time when its senior position is filled, due to the higher risk of
losing these workers. Hence the increase of the probability of a filled senior position induced by
a decrease of x¯L reduces the firm’s incentive to set a low promotion cut-off for high-skill workers.
Even though there are also other side effects, the numerical evidence shown in figure 7 suggests
that the described mechanism dominates giving rise to strategic substitutability between the
two promotion thresholds. A substitution effect also applies if we consider the impact of an
exogenous decrease of x¯Hi = x¯H on the optimal promotion threshold for low skilled, although
the effect is much smaller in this case (black solid curve). The partial equilibrium obtains at the
intersection of the two curves, since no firm has incentives to deviate.
If we increase α1 = α2 to 0.8 we find the equilibrium promotion cut-offs x¯
pe
L = 56.8, x¯
pe
H =
26.5, thus both types of workers are promoted earlier (red curves). This trend is continued
further when we increase α1 = α2 to 0.9. Here the equilibrium promotion cut-offs are x¯
pe
L = 53.9
and x¯peH = 24.7 (blue curves). In the limiting case when α1 = α2 = 1 we arrive at the economy
with only low skill workers with productivity level cL2 = 1.95 and the corresponding equilibrium
threshold is x¯peL = 51 (see section 3.3). Hence, we can conclude that a lower average skill
level in the labour force (due to the larger share of low skill workers) is associated with earlier
promotions. In the next section we check if this result will persist after the general equilibrium
adjustment in the transition rates.
4.3 General equilibrium
Finding a general equilibrium for the model with heterogeneous skills is substantially more
complex compared to the benchmark case with homogeneous workers treated in Section 3.2.
First, the number of states in which a single firm can be found is more than doubled in a setting
with heterogeneous workers. Combined with the fact that the shares of high and low skill
workers in the pool of applicants are endogenous, this would triple the number of steady-state
equations describing firms’ transitions in a heterogeneous setting. Second, the best response
function, for which a fixed-point has to be found is two dimensional. Third, the determination
of the best response (x¯L∗i , x¯
H∗
i ) to a pair of market promotion values (x¯L, x¯H) in a general
equilibrium setting requires to first calculate the transition rates and the average fraction of
each skill group in the pools of applicants (α1 and α2) under the stationary distribution implied
by (x¯L, x¯H) and then to determine the individually optimal promotion threshold based on the
analysis presented in Section 4.1. All of these steps are computationally intensive, so due to the
high complexity of the model we follow a different path for the analysis of the general equilibrium
and rely on a simulation of the model which captures explicitly the (stochastic) transition of each
worker between simple jobs, junior and senior positions. Another advantage of this approach
is a possibility of performing several extensions, such as a case of pyramidal firms, which is a
straightforward extension of the simulation but would require a completely different and hardly
tractable analytical model.
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Figure 8: Replication of figure 4. Left panel: Estimated expected firm profits for x¯ = 45.
Each box plot summarizes 100 profit estimations obtained by simulation for a given x¯i. The
red curve is the exact value of the objective function depicted also in figure 4. Right panel:
Approximated best response function. For each value of the market promotion cut-off x¯ the
mean of the estimated expected discounted profits for different values of x¯i are ranked with 1
being the highest.
4.3.1 Simulation analysis of the model
We implement a simulation model in which every firm and worker is a separate agent and the
stochastic matching between firms and workers as well as the random retirement of workers by
firms is explicitly modeled. For every profile of the firms’ promotion thresholds the resulting
long-run transition rates as well as the discounted expected present values of the different firms
upon entering the market are determined based on a sufficiently large ensemble of simulation
runs. The details of the simulation are described in Appendix B.5 In order to validate this
approach and to show that it replicates very well the theoretical results for the cases, in which
such findings are available, we first consider our benchmark case discussed in Section 3.2 with
fixed promotion time x¯ = 45 and a = 1, i.e. workers are homogeneous with respect to skills.
Table 4 displays the results of the simulation analysis and compares them to the numerical
results presented in section 2.3. It can be seen that the results obtained through the simulations
closely match the values obtained through the analytical approach. In Appendix B it is also
demonstrated that the dependence of the rates d10(x), d
N
11(x) on the junior worker’s experience
x, as well as the dependence of the different rates on the market threshold x¯, as shown in Figures
2 and 3, are exactly reproduced using the simulation approach. Finally, figure 8 also shows that
the best response function x¯∗i (x¯) can be obtained by comparing the expected values of an entering
firm generated through simulations across different values of an individual firm’s threshold x¯i.
The figure compares the simulation results to the analytical ones shown in figure 4. The heat
map in the right panel of figure 8 provides a summary of the simulation results by ranking the
means of the simulated discounted sums of profits for each promotion choice of a deviating firm
x¯i on the y-axis for a given market promotion x¯ on the x-axis. Then, the lighter the color, the
higher discounted sum of profits the firm achieves on average by setting the corresponding x¯i
5The simulation is done in RepastJ, a software for agent-based modeling.
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a = 1; x¯ = 45
Simulation SD Numerical Simulation SD Numerical
λ1 0.0145 0.0002 0.0145 Internally promoted 0.0575 0.0007 0.0576
λ2 0.0146 0.0006 0.0146 Job-to-job movers 0.0126 0.0004 0.0124
q1 0.0171 0.0002 0.0171 d00 0.1256 0.0021 0.1273
q2 0.0036 0.0002 0.0036 d01 0.1772 0.0021 0.1760
e0 0.3545 0.0041 0.3577 d10 0.1270 0.0021 0.1270
e1 0.2985 0.0021 0.2966 d
S
11 0.0633 0.0018 0.0633
e2 0.3487 0.0030 0.3456 d
N
11 0.1082 0.0014 0.1063
Table 4: Comparison between simulation and numerical results, SD: standard deviation. Simu-
lation values are obtained by taking an average over the last 1000 iterations of each run, where
one run consists of 1500 iterations. Averages over 100 simulation runs are shown.
for a given x¯. These results indicate that the simulation model is not only in a reliable way
generating the transition rates emerging under a certain strategy profile of firms, but is also well
suited to determine an individual firm’s optimal promotion strategy. Our simulation approach
can be used also in settings in which an analytical characterization of this best response is not
feasible, which will become particularly relevant in several model extensions considered below.
4.3.2 Equilibrium promotion cut-offs
For the version of the model with two skill levels the analysis in section 4.1 allows us to (nu-
merically) determine the symmetric partial equilibrium thresholds (x¯peL (ζ), x¯
pe
H (ζ)) for a given
vector ζ of transition rates and market thresholds. Therefore, in this section the simulation is
used only to determine the long-run transition rates for a given strategy profile. We first set the
promotion cut-offs equal to the partial equilibrium values under the given vector of transition
rates and fractions of low skill applicants in the two markets, which we denote by ζ0 (see section
4.2). Using the simulation we then determine the actual transition rates and fractions of low
skill applicants in the two markets ζ1 = {λ1, λ2, q1, q2, α1, α2} under these promotion cut-offs.
Inserting ζ1 into the firm’s decision problem (20) we then calculate the symmetric partial equi-
librium profile (x¯peL (ζ
1), x¯peH (ζ
1)) under these rates and adjust the conjecture for the values of
{x¯L, x¯H} in the direction of these new partial equilibrium values. This procedure is repeated till
the partial equilibrium values (rounded to the nearest integer) determined under the adjusted
transition rates coincide with the conjectured profile under which the rates have been calculated
and therefore a general equilibrium profile (x¯geL , x¯
ge
H ) has been found.
6
In table 5 the general equilibrium thresholds and the corresponding transition rates are
displayed for different fractions of low-skill workers in the population. In all scenarios the
fraction of low-skill workers among the applicants for junior positions (α1) are close to their
average fraction in the workforce (a), whereas the fraction of low-skilled among the applicants
for senior positions (α2) are significantly smaller: (α2 < a). This effect is due to the slower
promotion of low-skill workers compared to their high-skill peers, which makes them under-
represented in the market for senior positions. For instance in the case a = 0.7, even though
6In Table 7 in Appendix B we illustrate the algorithm by displaying all steps needed to find the equilibrium
values of x¯L and x¯H for a = 0.7. Although we do not provide a general convergence proof for our algorithm, we
were able to find general equilibrium values for all considered scenarios using this approach.
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a = 0.9 a = 0.8 a = 0.7
Equilibrium
Promotion
Cut-Offs
{x¯geL , x¯geH } = {49, 25} {x¯geL , x¯geH } = {52, 27} {x¯geL , x¯geH } = {55, 28}
Transition
Rates: ζge
α1 = 0.8903;α2 = 0.8650 α1 = 0.7813;α2 = 0.7385 α1 = 0.6733;α2 = 0.6169
(0.0033); (0.0088) (0.0043); (0.0121) (0.0048); (0.0130)
λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0146 λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0146 λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0145
(0.0002); (0.0005) (0.0002); (0.0005) (0.0002); (0.0005)
q1 = 0.01720; q2 = 0.00355 q1 = 0.01717; q2 = 0.00355 q1 = 0.01716; q2 = 0.00357
(0.0002); (0.0002) (0.0002); (0.0001) (0.0002); (0.0001)
Distribution
eL0 = 0.3485; e
H
0 = 0.3901 e
L
0 = 0.3443; e
H
0 = 0.3873 e
L
0 = 0.3393; e
H
0 = 0.3852
(0.0045); (0.0130) (0.0042); (0.0092) (0.0048); (0.0066)
eL1 = 0.3110; e
H
1 = 0.2276 e
L
1 = 0.3200; e
H
1 = 0.2347 e
L
1 = 0.3293; e
H
1 = 0.2392
(0.0025); (0.0074) (0.0024); (0.0049) (0.0027); (0.0040)
eL2 = 0.3415; e
H
2 = 0.3832 e
L
2 = 0.3367; e
H
2 = 0.3790 e
L
2 = 0.3324; e
H
2 = 0.3766
(0.0034); (0.0121) (0.0032); (0.0083) (0.0040); (0.0062)
Table 5: Equilibrium promotion cut-offs with two skill groups. Transition rates and distribution
values for each run are obtained by averaging over the last 1000 iterations, where one run consists
of 1500 iterations. The displayed values are averages over 100 simulation runs with standard
deviation across runs in parenthesis.
70% of the agents are low skill, only 61.7% or of the applicants to senior positions are also low
skill.
Comparing the general equilibrium thresholds with the partial equilibrium values discussed in
section 4.2 we observe that the promotion thresholds for high-skill workers are hardly affected by
general equilibrium effects, whereas the promotion threshold for low-skill worker are significantly
lower in general equilibrium compared to the partial equilibrium. For the case of a = 0.7 we
obtain x¯geL (ζ
ge) = 55 in general equilibrium compared to a threshold of x¯peL (ζ
0) = 60 obtained
for the partial equilibrium under the benchmark transition rates and the assumption that both
for the junior and the senior positions the fraction of low-skill workers is given by α1 = α2 =
a = 0.7. Intuitively, the reason for this difference is that under the partial equilibrium values
(x¯peL , x¯
pe
H ) = (60/28) the firm’s actual job filling rate for senior positions on the market q2 (see
Table 7 in Appendix B) is lower and that for junior positions q1 is higher compared to the value
assumed in the partial equilibrium (see Table 4). As we know from figure 4, this induces the
firm to promote earlier, especially the majority group of low-skill workers and as a result x¯L is
lower in general equilibrium than under partial equilibrium.
Analyzing the impact of a, we can see that qualitatively, the result that higher share of low
skill workers is associated with earlier promotions remains unchanged after endogenizing the
transition rates. Recall that in section 3.3 we have shown that lower quality of the homogeneous
labour force is associated with later promotions. How can these two findings be reconciled?
The key difference between these settings is that under worker heterogeneity an increase of the
fraction of low skill workers reduces the expected skill of a worker hired from the market relative
to the skill of the junior worker under consideration for internal promotion, regardless of the
actual type of the junior worker. So the internal candidate becomes better in relative terms
compared to the average external candidate. This induces earlier internal promotions. With
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homogeneous workers by definition the skill of an outside hire is always identical to that of an
internal candidate. So when the skill level is falling firms want to compensate for the lower
qualification of their internal candidates and let them accumulate more experience by delaying
internal promotions. Thus changes in the quality of the labour force can have principally different
implications for promotions in the two settings with homogeneous and heterogeneous workers.
Taking into account that the firm’s senior job filling rate decreases with the fraction of low
skill workers we observe that the general equilibrium reinforces the partial equilibrium effect
and leads to even earlier promotions of low skill workers. Overall, this discussion highlights that
explicitly considering potential heterogeneities in the workforce is essential for understanding the
relationship between the (average) skill level in the worker population and the firms’ optimal
promotion thresholds.
Table 5 also displays the distribution of high and low skill workers across hierarchical levels.
In equilibrium larger fraction of high skill workers are in managerial positions. For instance,
considering the case in which 70% of the agents are low skill (a = 0.7), approximately 61.2%
(= eH2 /(e
H
1 +e
H
2 )) of high skill workers who are employed in professional jobs are on level 2 (61.8%
in the case a = 0.8 and 62.8% when a = 0.9). This follows from the earlier promotion time firms
set for high skill workers. As the fraction of low skill workers (a) decreases, the equilibrium
promotion cut-offs: x¯L and x¯H increase which leads to fewer workers in senior positions (eL2 and
eH2 ) for both skill groups. This result corresponds to the findings from the benchmark model
that later promotions increase the fraction of workers employed in junior jobs and decrease the
fraction of senior workers.
5 Pyramidal firm structure
In this section we make a final extension to the model by introducing pyramidal firms with two
junior positions and one senior. Here, we follow the empirical evidence that firms are organized
as hierarchical pyramids in which the number of positions on each level decreases the higher the
hierarchical level (Caliendo et al., 2015). Moreover, empirical studies find that firms of different
sizes vary in many aspects concerning workers’ careers. For instance, large firms pay higher
wages than small firms (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Fox, 2009; Oi and Idson, 1999), employees in
bigger firms tend to be older, have longer tenure and higher human capital (Oi and Idson, 1999).
Following the documented size-related differences in firm behavior, we introduce ”large” firms
into the simulation to explore how the firm size affects promotion timing. More specifically, we
consider the case when some of the firms on the market have a pyramidal structure with three
positions (”large” firms) while the rest have a vertical hierarchy with two positions (”small”
firms) as in the benchmark model. In order to isolate the firm structure effect on optimal
promotion, we abstract from the synergy effect and consider the case of homogeneous workers.
We define the additional possible states of pyramidal firms as follows: d20 are firms which
have two junior workers and no senior worker, dNN21 are the firms which have all three positions
filled and none of the junior workers is searching for a senior position in another firm. Next, dNS21
denotes the pyramidal firms which have two junior workers and one senior worker and one of
the junior workers is already searching. And finally, dSS21 denotes the firms in which both junior
31
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
600/0 480/80 360/160 240/240 120/320 0/400
Average q1
Average q2
(a) Vacancy-filling rates
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
600/0 480/80 360/160 240/240 120/320 0/400
Average q22
Average q23
(b) q2 decomposition
 0.29
 0.3
 0.31
 0.32
 0.33
 0.34
 0.35
 0.36
 0.37
600/0 480/80 360/160 240/240 120/320 0/400
Average e0
Average e1
Average e2
(c) Distribution of workers
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 0.045
 0.05
 0.055
 0.06
600/0 480/80 360/160 240/240 120/320 0/400
Average promotion rate
Average job-to-job transition rate
(d) Promotions
Figure 9: Market adjustments: simulation values are obtained by taking and average over the
last 1000 iterations of each run, where one run consists of 1500 iteration. The values show
an average over 100 simulation runs and the bands display the minimal and maximal average
recorded.
workers are searching7.
5.1 Effects on labour flows
To demonstrate how the presence of pyramidal firm influences the labour flows and the allocation
of workers to different types of jobs we incrementally increase the number of pyramidal firms
on the market keeping the promotion cut-off at its benchmark equilibrium value x¯ = 45. Figure
9 presents the results from the simulation and shows the adjustment of transition rates when
the market moves from having only vertical firms to having only pyramidal firms. Averages of
the variables as well as 95% confidence intervals are displayed. The transition of firm types is
shown on the x-axis, where at the origin we have 600 firms with two positions and 0 firms with
three positions (600/0) or 1200 jobs in total. This is our benchmark model considered above.
We gradually decrease the number of vertical firms and increase the number of pyramidal firms
while keeping the total number of jobs constant. For example, (360/160) means 360 firms with
two positions and 160 firms with three positions and so on. The last point (0/400) shows the
case with no two-position firms and 400 pyramidal firms.
Changing the market structure by introducing pyramidal firms increases the senior vacancy-
filling rate q2 approximately five-fold (figure 9a). The presence of more three-position firms
increases the number of junior workers in the market (figure 9c). Since there are more junior
7Additionally, the upper script ”3” denotes a pyramidal firm.
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workers and because the promotion cut-off is kept constant, the pool of applicants to senior
positions becomes larger and the probability that a firm finds a senior worker from the market
increases. For instance, in the case when there are only pyramidal firms in the market (0/400),
the number of searching junior workers is on average 0.1332 (= dS311 + d
NS
21 + 2d
SS
21 ) whereas
in the benchmark case (600/0) it is 0.0633 (= dS11). On the other hand, there are on average
0.0775 (= d300 + d
3
10 + d20) senior vacancies in the market with three-position firms only and
0.2543 (= d00 + d10) in the benchmark scenario. Hence, more e1 workers compete for fewer
senior vacancies and firms fill more often their e2 positions from the market. Consequently, the
number of internally promoted workers decreases while more e1 workers reach senior position by
changing firms (figure 9d). We further decompose the senior vacancy filling rate q2 into senior
vacancies filled by workers who were previously employed in two-position firms: q22; and such
filled by workers who were employed in three-position firms: q32 (figure 9b)
8. This distinction
becomes relevant if the two types of firms set different promotion cut-offs. On the other hand,
the job-finding rates λ1 and λ2 do not respond strongly to the changing market structure because
they are primarily driven by workers’ search intensity.9
5.2 Optimal promotion
Next, we study the optimal promotion cut-off in the market with heterogeneous firms. In that
respect two questions arise. First, how does the optimal promotion policy of a pyramidal firm
compare to that of a vertical one, and, second, how does the presence of pyramidal firms influence
the optimal promotion threshold of the vertical firms. In order to study these issues, we adjust
the approach to simulate the discounted sum of profits of a single firm, which is described and
validated for our benchmark case in Appendix B, for the setting with heterogeneous firms.
We consider a market with 540 vertical firms and 40 pyramidal firms. As a starting point
we keep the market promotion threshold at x¯ = 45 and use the transition rates generated for
this setting from the simulation: ζ0 = {λ1, λ2, q1, q2} = {0.01449, 0.01452, 0.01614, 0.00429}.
We then compare the expected discounted profit of a single vertical respectively pyramidal
firm across different values of its own promotion threshold x¯i
j , j = 2, 3. Figure 10 plots the
results for a two- and three- position firm respectively. We observe that both types of firms
should delay their promotion time in response to the firm heterogeneity. A vertical firm achieves
highest expected profits if it sets the promotion time at x¯2i = 75, whereas a pyramidal firm
maximizes expected profits at x¯3i = 95. This result is driven by the higher vacancy-filling rate
of senior positions (q2) and the lower vacancy-filling rate of junior positions (q1), as already
shown in figure 4. Firms would like to keep their junior worker longer, given that they have
higher chance to hire a senior worker from the market and that finding a new junior worker
becomes more difficult. Furthermore, for pyramidal firms it is optimal to promote later than
their vertical competitors. Before discussing the intuition for this finding we verify whether our
results qualitatively stay intact if we take into account the adjustment of the other firms on the
market and of the transition rates in general equilibrium.
In order to obtain the general equilibrium promotion cut-offs in this market we again employ
the procedure used already for the case of two skill groups and described in Appendix B. Since
8Note that: q2 = q
2
2 + q
3
2
9See figure 14 in Appendix C.
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Figure 10: Optimal responses of deviating vertical (left panel) and pyramidal (right panel) firms
with x¯2 = x¯3 = 45.
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Figure 11: Profit function and best response of a two-position firm (left panel) and three-position
firm (right panel) in a market with 540 vertical firms and 40 pyramidal firms.
we now have two types of firms, in each step of the algorithm we determine for given transition
rates and cut-off values of both types of firms in the market the best response for each type
of firm. However, since in this setting with heterogeneous firms we do not have an analytical
characterization of the firm’s best response function, we use the results from the best response
simulations to guide us in which direction to alter the conjectured promotion cut-offs of both
types of firms before simulating the new transition rates. The algorithm stops if the optimal
response of both types of firms coincides with the conjectured promotion cut-offs.
Applying this procedure we find that {x¯2ge, x¯3ge} = {50, 85} is an equilibrium in the market
with 540 vertical and 40 pyramidal firms. Figure 11 displays the expected discounted profits of
the two types of firms as a function of their promotion threshold in this setting. The distribution
of workers and firms as well as the equilibrium transition rates are summarized in table 6. Hence,
the insights that the presence of pyramidal firms induces delayed promotion of all firms, compared
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a = 1; x¯2 = 50; x¯3 = 85
Sim SD Sim SD Sim SD
λ1 0.0145 0.0002 d00 0.1074 0.0021 d
S3
11 0.0028 0.0003
λ2 0.0146 0.0004 d
3
00 0.0036 0.0004 d20 0.0056 0.0004
q1 0.0168 0.0002 d01 0.1528 0.0018 d
NN
21 0.0045 0.0004
q22 0.0031 0.0001 d
3
01 0.0052 0.0004 d
NS
21 0.0038 0.0003
q32 0.0005 0.00004 d10 0.1254 0.0021 d
SS
21 0.0008 0.0002
e0 0.3411 0.0040 d
3
10 0.0056 0.0004 Internally promoted 0.0503 0.0006
e1 0.3266 0.0021 d
N
11 0.1028 0.0014 Promotion rate (vertical) 0.0538 0.0007
e2 0.3334 0.0021 d
N3
11 0.0083 0.0004 Promotion rate (pyramidal) 0.0284 0.0010
n 2.3677 0.0356 dS11 0.0527 0.0017 Job-to-job movers 0.0110 0.0003
Table 6: Distribution of firms and workers; and equilibrium transition rates. SD: standard
deviation. Simulation values are obtained by taking and average over the last 1000 iterations
of each run, where one run consists of 1500 iteration. Averages over 100 simulation runs are
shown.
to the benchmark of a market of vertical firms, and that pyramidal firms should promote later
than vertical ones, also apply in a full general equilibrium setting.
On average, 34.1% of agents are in simple jobs, 32.7% in junior positions and 33.4% in senior
positions. Among those employed in professional jobs almost half are on level 1 and the other half
occupies senior positions10. Further 6.1% of workers are searching on-the-job while on average
5% are internally promoted per year. Another 1.1% of junior workers move to a different firm to
gain a promotion. In comparison with our benchmark case, having some firms with two level 1
jobs increases the equilibrium fraction of workers in junior positions. However, both the yearly
promotion rate as well as the job transition rate decrease slightly compared to the benchmark
model as result of the overall fewer senior jobs on the market and the larger promotion cut-offs
firms choose in equilibrium. This is different from the partial equilibrium setting where the
job-to-job transition rate increased as a result of firm heterogeneity (see figure 9d). We see
that after endogenizing x¯2 and x¯3, the general equilibrium effect reverses the heterogeneous firm
effect on the job-to-job transition rate and reduces the percentage of job-to-job movers from
1.4% in the partial equilibrium to 1.1% in the general equilibrium. Hence, in the equilibrium
with heterogeneous firms, the job-to-job transition rate is slightly suppressed compared to the
benchmark case where 1.2% of workers change firms to gain promotion. On the other hand, the
negative impact of firm heterogeneity on the promotion rate (see figure 9d) is reinforced by the
general equilibrium effect and the promotion rate is further reduced form 5.5% in the partial
equilibrium to 5% in the general equilibrium. The rest of the transition rates are quantitatively
very similar to the ones in the benchmark case with the exception of q1 which is slightly lower.
On average it takes longer for firms to fill their junior positions in the market with heterogeneous
firms. There is a larger pool of competing vacancies for level 1 workers and, as shown above, in
equilibrium firms choose longer promotion time to counteract this effect.
Furthermore, pyramidal firms set a higher promotion cut-off than vertical firms. Intuitively,
this is due to the fact that for pyramidal firms the probability that the senior position is filled
at a given point in time is larger than for a vertical firm and also there is the possibility that the
10p1 = 0.3266/(0.3266 + 0.3334) = 0.4949 or approximately 49.5%
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other junior worker in the firm has already reached the promotion threshold and hence would be
appointed to the senior position if the senior worker retires. Both these effects increase the firm’s
incentive to delay promotion in order not to risk loosing the junior worker. Hence, the pyramidal
firm promotes later than the vertical one. Specifically, in equilibrium 63.2% of pyramidal firms
have their senior position filled (= (d301 +d
N3
11 +d
3S
11 +d
NN
21 +d
NS
21 +d
SS
21 )/(d
3
00 +d
3
10 +d
3
01 +d
N3
11 +
d3S11 +d20 +d
NN
21 +d
NS
21 +d
SS
21 )) compared to 57% of vertical firms (= (d01 +d
N
11 +d
S
11)/(d00 +d10 +
d01 +d
N
11 +d
S
11)). Further, 5.4% of the junior workers employed in vertical firms are promoted per
year compared to 2.8% of workers in pyramidal firms. Due to their promotion cut-off pyramidal
firms do not only have slower turnover in their junior positions compared to vertical firms, but
also have junior workers and senior workers with higher average experience than their smaller
competitors with vertical structure Average experience of junior workers in vertical firms is 29.3
vs. 49.6 for junior workers in pyramidal firms. Also, senior workers in vertical firms have on
average experience of 50.8 compared to 80.7 for senior workers in pyramidal firms. This indicates
a firm size wage gap of 6.3% in junior positions (= βc1(e
γ49.6 − eγ29.3)/(βc1eγ29.3)) and 9.4% in
senior positions (= βc2(e
γ80.7 − eγ50.8)/(βc2eγ50.8)). Hence, our model shows that considering
endogenous promotion choices can provide an explanation for the difference in workers’ tenure
and wages between small and large firms as reported in a survey by Oi and Idson (1999) and
more recently by Lallemand et al. (2007) for five European countries. It can also capture a
positive relationship between the firm size wage gap and the hierarchical levels as found by Fox
(2009) for US and Swedish white-collar workers.
6 Robustness check: complementarity between worker experi-
ence
In the benchmark model used so far we have assumed production function of the firm that is fully
separable between the output of the different workers. In particular, under this assumption the
marginal increase of a firm’s output due to higher experience of a junior or senior worker does
not depend on whether the other position(s) in the firm are filled or which experience workers
filling these other positions have. Although this separability assumption strongly increases the
analytical tractability of the model, it might be considered as somehow restrictive from an
economic perspective. Relying on our simulation approach we can however check the robustness
of our main findings if this assumption is dropped and a potential complementarity between the
experience of junior and senior workers is taken into account. In particular, using again our
benchmark setting with only vertical firms and homogeneous worker skills, we consider a CES
production function of the form
f(1 1, x, 1 2, y) =
[
1 1(d1 + c1e
γx)
σ−1
σ + 1 2(d2 + c2e
γy)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (21)
where f(1 1, x, 1 2, y) is the output of a firm which has a junior worker with experience x and
a senior worker with experience y. Here 1 1 and 1 2 are indicator functions which take a value
of 1 if the respective position is filled and 0 otherwise. The parameter σ is the elasticity of
substitution between the junior and the senior worker and in the limiting case of σ →∞, we
have the linear production function used in the benchmark model. The profit of the firm is given
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Figure 12: The optimal response of a single firm obtained by the simulation approach described
in Appendix B. The average profit for each promotion cut-off of the deviating firm given x¯ is
recorded and the averages are ranked with 1 being the highest.
by pi((1 1, x, 1 2, y) = (1− β)f(1 1, x, 1 2, y).
Empirical estimates suggest that there is imperfect substitutability between young and old or
experienced and inexperienced workers. For example, using data for the U.S., UK and Canada,
Card and Lemieux (2001) estimate the elasticity of substitution between men with similar edu-
cational attainment but different ages to be in the interval 4-6. D’Amuri et al. (2010), on the
other hand, find based on German data that the elasticity of substitution between workers with
the same educational level but different experience is 3.3. We choose an intermediate value of
the existing estimates of σ = 4 and calculate for varying values of the market promotion cut-off
the expected firm payoff under different values its own cutoff. Figure 12 clearly indicates that
introducing a CES production technology preserves the result that the optimal promotion deci-
sion of a single firm increases in the market promotion cut-off. Actually, even the observation
that choosing x¯i = 45 is optimal for a firm if all competitors use x¯ = 45 carries over to this case
of a non-linear production function. Taking into account that transition rates are not directly
influenced by the production function, but just by the choice of cut-offs this establishes that
also in this setting x¯ge = 45 is a general equilibrium. Overall, apart from the key feature of
strategic complementarity between promotion times also our other qualitative findings seem to
stay intact as we move to a general CES production technology.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we develop and analyze a model which embeds the choice of optimal promotion
times by hierarchical firms in a search and matching labor market with on the job search, which
captures the option of a firm to fill senior positions through outside recruiting rather than inter-
nal promotion. A new methodological approach combining analytical results with agent-based
simulations allows us to characterize the promotion strategies in a general equilibrium of this
model, both in the presence of workers with heterogeneous skills and of firms with heterogeneous
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hierarchical structures. Our findings about the effect of the level and heterogeneity of worker
skills and of the firm’s hierarchical structure on optimal promotion times are innovative insight
into the determinants of firm behavior on the labor market and into the resulting implications
for labor flows. They provide theory-based explanations for empirical observations about the
difference in promotion times between high and low skill workers as well as about the relation-
ship between firm size and human capital. Furthermore, our results also give rise to several
innovative testable implication about the impact of different factors on promotion strategies,
which can be used as the theoretical basis for future empirical work in this area. Our insight
that the effects of parameter changes on promotion cut-offs are typically much smaller in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework than under the assumption of fixed job-filling/job finding rates at
the different hierarchical levels, highlights the importance of endogenizing the supply side of the
labor market when analyzing the design of promotion strategies.
From a methodological perspective this paper illustrates the potential of a careful combina-
tion of analytical and simulation approaches for the analysis of labor markets with frictions and
different types of heterogeneities. The flexibility that this approach allows with respect to the
structure of the analyzed model opens the possibility for addressing a wide range of issues in
labour economics and beyond.
The analysis presented in this paper can be extended in several promising directions. Apart
from empirical work building on our results, endogenizing wages and considering a simultane-
ous setting of wages and promotion cut-offs by firms may provide further economic insights.
Moreover, the impact of promotion strategies on wage inequality is a related promising area.
Extending the framework developed in this paper allows to study the role of the promotion chan-
nel for transforming different types of skill heterogeneities into wage inequalities under different
assumptions about the firms’ hierarchical structure. In that respect also the role of profes-
sional networks for job transitions and emerging wage inequality might be considered. These
networks might evolve endogenously through employment at the same company and influence
the potential of workers for finding senior positions outside the own firm. Finally, the fact that
individual firms do not internalize the general equilibrium effects in our model is likely to create
a deadweight loss of welfare which opens space for the discusion of policy and regulation.
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Appendix A: Additional Calculations for the Benchmark Case
First, we solve equation (9), which is a first-order linear differential equation. This equation
has the form J ′10(x) = rJ10(x) + g(x), where g(x) is given by:
−g(x) = (d1 + c1eγx)(1− β)− s+ q2 (pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)
r + ρ+ q2
+ q2Ke
(r+ρ+q2)x
With A denoting the integration constant the general solution of this equation is given by
J10(x) = Ae
rx + erx
∫
g(x)e−rx. The second part of this expression is given by:
erx
∫
g(x)e−rx = −erx
[∫ (
d1(1− β)− s+ q2 (pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)
r + ρ+ q2
)
e−rxdx
+
∫
c1(1− β)e(γ−r)xdx+
∫
q2Ke
(ρ+q2)xdx
]
=
d1(1− β)− s
r
+ q2
(pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
− e
rxc1(1− β)e(γ−r)x
γ − r −
erxq2Ke
(ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
=
d1(1− β)− s
r
+ q2
(pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ −
q2Ke
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
Further, we determine the function JN11(0, xi). To do so recall that J
N
11(x, y) is given by:
rJN11(x, y) = pi1(x) + ∆ + pi2(y)− ρ(JN11(x, y)− J10(x)) +
∂JN11(x, y)
∂x
Inserting J10(x) into this equation we get:
(r + ρ)JN11(x, y) = pi1(x) + ∆ + pi2(y) +
∂JN11(x, y)
∂x
+ ρ
[d1(1− β)− s
r
+ q2
pi2(x¯) + ∆ + s
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+Aerx +
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ −
q2Ke
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
]
The general solution of this linear first order differential equation is given by:
JN11(x, y) =
s(r + q2)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+
ρKe(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
+
d1(1− β)− s
r
+Aerx +
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ
+
pi2(y) + ∆
r + ρ
+
ρq2(pi2(x¯) + ∆)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
+De(r+ρ)x
with D being the integration constant. Evaluating this equation at y = x¯, we should get
JN11(x, x¯), which implies that D = 0, because:
(pi2(x¯) + ∆)
r + ρ
+
ρq2(pi2(x¯) + ∆)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
=
(pi2(x¯) + ∆)(r + q2)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
Inserting x = 0 and y = xi, we get the function J
N
11(0, xi):
JN11(0, xi) =
s(r + q2)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+
ρK
ρ+ q2
+
d1(1− β)− s
r
+A+
c1(1− β)
r − γ
+
(pi2(xi) + ∆)
r + ρ
+
ρq2(pi2(x¯) + ∆)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
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Proofs for the case with two skill levels. The differential equation for JNjf (x, y) is given by:
(r + ρ)JNjf (x, y) = pi1(x) + pi
f
2 (y) +
ρ(d1(1− β)− s)
r
+ ρq2
p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H) + s
r(r + ρ+ q2)
(22)
+ ρAje
rx +
ρc1(1− β)eγx
r − γ −
ρq2Kje
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
+
∂JNjf (x, y)
∂x
(23)
It can be rewritten as:
(r + ρ)JNjf (x, y) = d1(1− β) + pif2 (y) +
ρ(d1(1− β)− s)
r
+ ρq2
p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H) + s
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+ ρAje
rx +
(ρ+ r − γ)c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ −
ρq2Kje
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
+
∂JNjf (x, y)
∂x
Let Djf denote the integration constant, so the general solution of the above equation becomes:
JNjf (x, y) =
d1(1− β) + pif2 (y)
r + ρ
+
ρ(d1(1− β)− s)
r(r + ρ)
+ ρq2
p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H) + s
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
+
ρAje
rx
r + ρ− r +
(ρ+ r − γ)c1(1− β)eγx
(r − γ)(r + ρ− γ) −
ρq2Kje
(r+ρ+q2)x
(ρ+ q2)(r + ρ− (r + ρ+ q2)) +Djfe
(r+ρ)x
=
d1(1− β)
r
+
pif2 (y)
r + ρ
+
ρq2p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
+
[−s
r
+
rs
r(r + ρ)
+
ρq2s
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
]
+ Aje
rx +
c1(1− β)eγx
(r − γ) +
ρKje
(r+ρ+q2)x
(ρ+ q2)
+Djfe
(r+ρ)x
=
d1(1− β)− s
r
+
pif2 (y)
r + ρ
+
ρq2p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
+
s(r + q2)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+ Aje
rx +
c1(1− β)eγx
(r − γ) +
ρKje
(r+ρ+q2)x
(ρ+ q2)
+Djfe
(r+ρ)x
where Djf is the corresponding integration constant. Next we combine equations (15) and (17)
to find solution for the auxilliary variable J¯j(x) = Jj0(x) + ∆Jj(x):
J¯j(x) =
d1(1− β)− s
r
+ (r + q2)
p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H) + s
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+Aje
rx +
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ +
ρKje
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
(24)
Evaluating JNjL(x, y) at y = x¯L with the corresponding term DjL, J
N
jH(x, y) at y = x¯H with
the corresponding term DjH and taking a weighted average between the two we get (1 −
α2)J
N
jH(x, x¯H) = J¯j(x)− α2JNjL(x, x¯L). The right-hand side of this equation is given by:
J¯j(x) − α2JNjL(x, x¯L) = (r + q2)
p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)
− α2pi
L
2 (x¯L)
r + ρ
− α2 ρq2p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
− α2DjLe(r+ρ)x
+ (1− α2)
[d1(1− β)− s
r
+
(r + q2)s
r(r + ρ+ q2)
+Aje
rx +
c1(1− β)eγx
r − γ +
ρKje
(r+ρ+q2)x
ρ+ q2
]
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Consider the first four terms of this equation:
p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r + ρ
+
ρq2p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
− α2pi
L
2 (x¯L)
r + ρ
− α2 ρq2p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
− α2DjLe(r+ρ)x
= (1− α2) ρq2p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)
r(r + ρ+ q2)(r + ρ)
+ (1− α2)pi
H
2 (x¯H)
r + ρ
− α2DjLe(r+ρ)x
because p¯i2(x¯L, x¯H)− α2piL2 (x¯L) = (1− α2)piH2 (x¯H). Comparing J¯j(x)− α2JNjL(x, x¯L) with (1−
α2)J
N
jH(x, x¯H) we can see that (1 − α2)DjHe(r+ρ)x = −α2DjLe(r+ρ)x, so that (1 − α2)DjH +
α2DjL = 0.
Appendix B: Details of the Simulation Framework
General Simulation Setup
In the simulation of the model we consider a firm population NF and a worker population NW
with |NF | = nF , |NW | = nW . The sizes of both populations stay constant over time since a
new worker is added to the population only when a member of the population retires and a new
firm is added only if an existing firm has become empty and leaves the market. Each worker
j ∈ NW is characterized by her skill level (low/high) and each firm i ∈ NF by its promotion
cut-off(s) (x¯Li , x¯
H
i ). Any worker or firm entering the population inherits this characteristic from
the agent it replaces. The scenarios with a single skill group are treated as a special case of
the general setup in which all workers have low skills. The simulation evolves in discrete time
steps. Initially, at t = 0 all firms have no employees (type d00) and all workers are in simple
jobs. Afterwards, in every period t = 1, ..T the following steps are executed
1. Every firm i ∈ NF with a vacant senior position and a junior worker with skill s ∈ {L,H}
and experience x ≥ x¯si promotes this worker to the senior position.
2. All firms i ∈ NF with open junior or senior positions post these vacancies.
3. Every worker in a simple job sends with probability z an application to a random junior
vacancy.
4. Every searching junior worker (i.e. every junior worker whose experience is above its
employer’s promotion threshold) sends with probability z an application to a random
senior vacancy.
5. Every firm i ∈ NF for each of its vacancies randomly (with equal probabilities) selects one
of its applicants and hires this worker. If the firm has not received any applications then
the vacancy is not filled in period t.
6. The experience of all junior workers is updated.
7. Every senior worker retires with probability ρ.
8. All statistics (employed, unemployed, filled/unfilled vacancies, job finding rates, job filling
rates) for period t are recorded.
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Figure 13: Left panel: Number of d10 firms as a function of the junior worker’s experience (solid
line). Number of dN11 firms as a function of the junior worker’s experience (dashed line). The
vertical bars represent the minimum and maximum value recorded during the 100 simulation
runs where each value is an average over the last 500 iterations of each run and one run consists
of 1000 iterations. Right panel: Fraction of workers in junior positions (blue line) and senior
positions (red line) for different market promotion cut-offs. The confidence bands display the
minimal and maximal average recorded.
The job-finding rate at the first level (λ1) is defined as the number of agents in simple jobs
who found a junior position in the current period as a fraction of the total number of agents in
simple jobs in the beginning of the period. Similarly, the job-finding rate at the second level (λ2)
is the fraction of junior workers who found a senior position in another firm in the current period
relative to the total number of searching junior workers in the beginning of the period. On the
other hand, the job-filling rate of junior positions (q1) is the number of filled junior vacancies
during the current period as a fraction of total number of junior vacancies in the beginning
of the period. Analogously, the job-filling rate of senior positions (q2) is the fraction of filled
senior vacancies in the current period (excluding promotions) relative to the total number of
senior vacancies in the beginning of the period. Further, the promotion rate is calculated as
the fraction of promoted workers in the current period relative to the total number of employed
junior workers in the beginning of the period. On the other hand, the job-to-job transition rate
is defined as the newly hired managers (excluding promotions) as a fraction of the total number
of junior workers. And finally, α1 and α2 are the fractions of low skill applicants in the junior
and senior market, respectively.
In our simulation we consider populations of size nF = 600, nW = 1000 and for a given profile
of promotion thresholds {(x¯Li , x¯Hi )}i∈NF , 100 simulation runs are done where each run consists of
1500 iterations. We collect the average values of the job-finding rates (λ1, λ2), the vacancy-filling
rates (q1, q2), the distribution of firms and workers (d00, d10, d01, d
N
11, d
S
11, e0, e1, e2), the fractions
of low skill applicants in the two markets (α1, α2) and the number of exiting firms per period (n)
over the last 1000 periods of each run. The first 500 periods are disregarded in order to allow
the system to reach its stationary distribution.
In order to demonstrate the precision of the results obtained through the simulation we apply
our method to the benchmark case of only low-skilled workers, for which analytical results are
available. The good match of the different transition rates obtained in the simulation with the
exact values is demonstrated in Table in the main text. Here we present additional figures that
should be compared with the numerical results discussed in section 2.3. The left panel of figure
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Figure 14: Left panel: fraction of externally (job-to-job movers) and internally promoted workers
for different values of x¯. Right panel: job filling rates for junior and senior positions for different
search intensities of workers. The values show an average over 100 simulation runs and the
confidence bands display the minimal and maximal average recorded.
13 shows the number of firms of type d10 and d
N
11 as a function of the junior worker’s experience.
This figure replicates closely figure 2, which can be seen by comparing the simulation results
with the blue and red curve which are taken from figure 2. The right panel of figure 13, to be
compared with the right panel of figure 2, shows the dependence of the fraction of workers in
junior and senior positions from the promotion cut-off x¯ used by all firms. Again lines match
very well those shown in figure 2.
Figure 14 is a replication of figure 3 and shows the fraction of externally (job-to-job movers)
and internally promoted workers for different values of x¯ as well as well as the firms job filling
rates for junior and senior positions for different search intensities of workers. Also in this respect
the results obtained by simulation qualitatively and quantitatively are in close accordance with
the analytical results.
To illustrate that ability to simulate the market with heterogeneous firm profiles can allow
for helpful additional insights even in scenarios for which a numerical determination of the
equilibrium based on analytical results is possible, we show in figure 15 how the fraction of
internally promoted workers at a firm depends on the firm’s own promotion threshold if all
other firms promote at the equilibrium value of x¯ = 45. The figure shows that the fraction of
internally promoted workers decreases if x¯i becomes larger, which is qualitatively different from
an increase of the promotion level x¯ of all firms, which induces an increase of the fraction of
internally promoted.
Finding a General Equilibrium
In Table 7 the numerical procedure for finding general equilibrium promotion cut-offs with
the use of simulations is illustrated for the case with a fraction of a = 0.7 low skill work-
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Figure 15: Fraction of internally promoted workers of a single firm i for x¯i = [25..75], while
x¯ = 45 is kept fixed. x¯i is increased in steps of 5. For each x¯i we let the firm i fill its senior
position 5000 times and plot the fraction of internal promotions out of those 5000 hires.
ers. In step (1) we use as an input for the simulation the partial equilibrium values found
in section 4.2: x¯L = 60 and x¯H = 28 which are optimal under the fixed transition rates:
ζ0 = {λ1, λ2, q1, q2, α1, α2} = {0.0145, 0.0146, 0.0171, 0.0036, 0.7, 0.7}. These are labeled as
”Conjectured Cut-Offs”. The transition rates reported below the conjectured cut-offs are the
averages of the last 1000 iterations of 100 runs, where one run consists of 1500 iterations (stan-
dard deviation is given in parenthesis). The row ”Opt. Cut-Offs” then displays the optimal
promotions given these transition rates. The algorithm stops once the optimal cut-off values
coincide with the conjectured cut-off values.
a = 0.7
k (1) (2) (3)
Conjectured
Cut-Offs
{x¯L, x¯H} = {60, 28} {x¯L, x¯H} = {58, 27} {x¯L, x¯H} = {56, 28}
Rates ζk
(through
Simulation)
α1 = 0.6680;α2 = 0.6045 α1 = 0.6689;α2 = 0.6059 α1 = 0.6752;α2 = 0.6149
(0.0050); (0.0169) (0.0043); (0.0143) (0.0046); (0.0133)
λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0147 λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0147 λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0145
(0.0002); (0.0005) (0.0002); (0.0005) (0.0002); (0.0004)
q1 = 0.01751; q2 = 0.00337 q1 = 0.01731; q2 = 0.00350 q1 = 0.01726; q2 = 0.00354
(0.0002); (0.0001) (0.0002); (0.0002) (0.0001); (0.0001)
Opt. Cut-Offs {x¯L, x¯H} = {45, 27} {x¯L, x¯H} = {51, 28} {x¯L, x¯H} = {53, 28}
k (4) (5) (6)
Conjectured
Cut-Offs
{x¯L, x¯H} = {54, 28} {x¯L, x¯H} = {55, 29} {x¯L, x¯H} = {55, 28}
Rates ζk
(through
Simulation)
α1 = 0.6739;α2 = 0.6202 α1 = 0.6747;α2 = 0.6189 α1 = 0.6733;α2 = 0.6169
(0.0049); (0.0116) (0.0042); (0.0134) (0.0048); (0.0130)
λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0146 λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0145 λ1 = 0.0145;λ2 = 0.0145
(0.0002); (0.0004) (0.0002); (0.0004) (0.0002); (0.0005)
q1 = 0.01707; q2 = 0.00365 q1 = 0.01720; q2 = 0.00356 q1 = 0.01716; q2 = 0.00357
(0.0002); (0.0001) (0.0002); (0.0001) (0.0002); (0.0001)
Opt. Cut-Offs {x¯L, x¯H} = {61, 29} {x¯L, x¯H} = {54, 28} {x¯L, x¯H} = {55, 28}
Table 7: Steps to finding the general equilibrium promotion cut-offs x¯geL and x¯
ge
H for a = 0.7.
The values show an average over 100 simulation runs with the standard deviation in parenthesis.
44
Determining Firms’ Optimal Promotion Cut-offs
If the simulations are used only to determine the transition rates for a given uniform strategy
profile, we set (xLi , x
H
i ) = (x¯
L, x¯H) for all i ∈ NF and collect only the data discussed in the
previous subsection. However, in scenarios, in which no analytical characterization of the opti-
mal promotion cut-off of a firm for a given strategy profile of the other firms is available, the
simulations can also be used to determine the firm’s optimal response.
In order to find such a best response to given threshold values (x¯L, x¯H) of the competitors
we first employ the simulation to determine the (long-run) transition rates if all firms employ
these thresholds and then, using these rates, calculate the expected discounted sum of profits
of a single firm i for all values of (xLi , x
H
i ) from a finite grid covering the relevant range of x
L
and xH . Using this approach we implicitly assume that the change of the single firm’s threshold
does not affect the transition rates on the market, which is consistent with the assumption of a
continuum of firms underlying the theoretical model. For clarity of exposition we assume in the
following description that all workers have the same skill such that the firm strategy is described
by a single threshold xLi . The extension to the case of two skill levels as well as to other model
extensions, like pyramidal firms, is straight forward and not described in detail.11
For the calculation of the expected discounted payoff we assume that τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4 are random
variables such that τ1 ∼ Exp(q1), τ2 ∼ Exp(q2), τ3 ∼ Exp(λ2) and τ4 ∼ Exp(ρ), where q1, q2
and λ2 are the transition rates generated by the simulation and ρ is the retirement rate. Hence,
τ1 represents the waiting time until finding a junior worker, τ2 is the time until finding a senior
worker from the market, τ3 is the time until the junior worker who is searching for a senior
position moves to another firm and τ4 is the time until the senior worker retires.
We simulate a hypothetical firm from its entry to its exit from the market. Initially, the new
d00 firm makes the random draws, τ1 and τ2. If min{τ1, τ2} = τ1, the firm finds a junior worker
first and becomes of d10 type. Conversely, if min{τ1, τ2} = τ2 the firm finds the senior worker
first and becomes of d01 type. Next, if the firm is in the d10 state, it makes a random draw for
τ2 which is compared to the time left until the worker achieves x
L
i , the promotion cut-off of the
considered firm. Whichever comes first determines into which state the firm will transition next:
dN11 or d01, respectively.
On the other hand, if the firm after its first hire is of d01 type, it either finds a junior
worker or the senior worker retires in which case the firm exits. To determine which of these
two possibilities are realized, random draws for τ1 and τ4, are made. If min{τ1, τ4} = τ1, the
firm finds a junior worker and becomes of dN11 type and if min{τ1, τ4} = τ4, the firm exits the
labour market. Furthermore, if the firm is in dN11 state, a random draw τ4 is made which is then
compared with the time left until the junior worker achieves xLi . If the worker gains the x¯
L
i level
of experience first, the firm transitions into dS11 state. Otherwise, the senior worker retires and
the firm becomes of d10 type. Finally, for a firm in the state d
S
11, the random draws τ3 and τ4 are
compared. If min{τ3, τ4} = τ3, the searching junior worker moves to a different firm, whereas
if min{τ3, τ4} = τ4, the senior worker retires and is immediately replaced by the junior one. In
both cases the firm becomes of d01 type.
Once the sequence of the considered firm’s states from its entry until its exit from the market
11Details of the extension of our approach to the different model extensions is available from the authors upon
request.
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and the time spent in each state have been determined, the discounted sum of the firm’s profits
is calculated based on this data. In order to obtain an estimation of the expected firm’s profit,
the average discounted profit over 40000 instances of this firm is calculated. For each considered
value of the threshold xLi we calculate 100 estimations of the expected profit in this way. The
best response of the firm to (x¯L, x¯H) is then determined as the value xLi among all thresholds in
the considered grid for which the mean of the 100 estimated expected discounted profit values
is highest. In figure 8 we illustrate the approach by applying it to our benchmark scenario with
uniform skills of workers. The left panel of the figures shows how well the expected discounted
profit of the firm is approximated using our simulation approach and the right panel reproduces
the best response function shown in figure 5. In particular, the right panel of the figure illustrates
that the also a purely simulation-based procedure, which also relies on the simulation-based best
response function would arrive at the correct general equilibrium value of x¯ = 45, since this is
where the first diagonal coincides with the highest ranked value of x¯i.
Appendix C: Pyramidal Firms
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Figure 16: Job-fining rates for a varying fraction of pyramidal firms. The values show an average
over 100 simulation runs and the confidence bands display the minimal and maximal average
recorded.
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